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ABSTRACT
The question of the origins o f alliances is one o f the most debated issues in the 
theory of International Relations (IR). After reviewing the main theoretical 
approaches about alliances formation, the short-lived alliance of 1958 between 
Turkey and Israel and the rapidly developing new alliance between the same 
countries will be examined to test the alternative explanations of alliance behavior. 
The Turkish-Israeli alliances are of considerable interest intrinsically, given the 
importance of the two states and the region(s) in which they are located, and 
theoretically, given that both can shed light on different approaches to alliance 
formation and the relative dearth o f attention paid to alliances between or among 
smaller states. The various factors adduced to explain alliance formation -  external, 
domestic and ideational -  all play a role in this case study. Nevertheless, the 
evidence of the Turkish-Israeli relations indicate the predominance of external 
factors.
iv
ÖZET
Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisinde ittifakların kökeni en çok tartışılan konulardan 
birisidir. İttifakların kuruluşuna dair bellibaşlı teorik yaklaşımları gözden geçirdikten 
sonra, 1958 yılında Türkiye ile İsrail arasındaki kısa süreli ittifak ve aynı ülkeler 
arasında hızla gelişen yeni ittifak davranışı, bu olgunun seçenekli izahatını 
araştırmak için incelenecektir. Türkiye-İsrail ittifakları, iki ülkenin ve bulundukları 
bölgenin/bölgelerin önemi göz önüne alındığında ve teorik olarak her ikisinin de 
ittifak oluşumuna ayrı açıdan yaklaştığına dikkat edildiğinde ve nihayet küçük 
ülkeler arasındaki ittifaklara verilen göresel önem göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, 
oldukça önemli bir ilgi uyandırmaktadır. İttifak oluşumunu izah etmek için sunulan 
kanıtlar-dış, iç ve ülkü düzeyinde-hepsi bu çalı|)mada ele alınmaktadır. Ancak, 
Türkiye-İsrail ilişkilerinde dış etkenlerin ön planda rol oynadığı görülmektedir.
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CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES.
1.1 Introduction:
The question of the origins o f alliances^ is one of the most debated issues in 
the theory of International Relations (IR). Indeed, numerous studies and reflections 
come together under the generic label o f alliances, all of them aimed at explaining 
why states form alliances, when states ally and which alliance — given certain 
conditions -  can we expect to come about. Turning to the first issue, why alliances 
form, the most prevalent speculations concern the collective provision of national 
security. In other words, nations create alliances fundamentally as a response to 
perceived threat to national security. The different source of the threat, external or 
domestic, leads to two broad categories reflecting different approaches to why 
alliances form. The former, focused on external security, is linked to realism which 
has tended to draw on relations among great powers; the latter, focused on internal 
security, scrutinizes alliance formation by smaller states, especially developing 
countries. Apart from these two leading approaches, other explanations emphasizing 
the importance of social, cultural and political similarities or the function of alliances 
as tools constraining the behavior of states are also put forth by a smaller number of 
scholars.
For the purposes of this study, 1 define an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of cooperation 
between two or more states involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on 
security issues under a range of conditions in the future. Thus, I define alliance broadly to include 
informal alignments as well as formal alliance treaties. This is consistent with Stephen Walt, The 
Origins o f Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) which can be consulted for a survey of 
definitions.
After reviewing all these different arguments, the short-lived alliance of 1958 
between Turkey and Israel and the rapidly developing new alliance between the same 
countries will be examined to test the alternative explanations of alliance behavior. 
The Turkish-Israeli alliances are o f considerable interest intrinsically, given the 
importance of the two states and the region(s) in which they are located, and 
theoretically, given that both can shed light on different approaches to alliance 
formation and the relative dearth o f attention paid to alliances between or among 
smaller states.
1.2 Approaches based on external security:
Alliance theories are traditionally dominated by the realist and neorealist 
schools of thought. According to this tradition, the systemic structure, structural 
polarity and systemic anarchy, determine the formation of alliances. In particular, the 
anarchy characteristic of the international system leads states to accord primacy to 
their security. According to Martin Wight, the function of an alliance is to “reinforce 
the security of the allies or to promote their interests in the external world” .^  States 
incapable o f facing unilaterally a stronger enemy decide to cooperate with other 
states in the same situation in order to increase their security by massing their 
capabilities against a common enemy. ^
■ Martin Wight, Power Politics, (New York; Holmes & Maier, 1978), p. 122
 ^ Liska argues that “Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something” (p.l2) 
and emphasizes the role of external threat, calling it the “primary source o f alliance”, George Liska, 
Nations in Alliance. The Limits o f Interdependence, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1962), p. 13
Essentially, this is what is usually called the “aggregation of power” model, 
the most well-know explanation of the origin o f alliances/* This model assumes that 
allies value each other for the military assistance they can provide one another in 
deterring a common threat. In other words, in the face of external threat, states seek 
alliances for the primary purpose of enhancing their effective military capabilities 
through combination with others. Therefore, military power, security interests and 
external threats rather than domestic factors determine states’ alliance behavior.
In this regard, it is necessary to point out the connection between the theory 
of balance of power and the theory of alliances: alliances, according to this 
perspective, are the means by which states maintain among themselves an 
approximately equal distribution of power, in Morgenthau’s words “a necessary 
function of the balance o f power operating in a multiple-state system” .^  In his 
opinion, within the struggle for power that characterizes international politics, each 
state may increase unilaterally its own power by internal means, or aggregate its 
power to the one of other states, or prevent that other states mass their power with the 
enemy. The first choice implies an armaments race, whereas, the second and third 
options entail the formation of alliances.^
More recently, Stephen Walt has developed an in-depth analysis of the 
formation of alliances, in which the concept of “external threat” is central to his 
“balance of threat theory” .^  Walt criticizes the classic structural balance of power 
theory for its overemphasis on the concept of power (defined as aggregate 
capabilities). According to him, states seek allies not to balance power but, rather, to
Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1985), pp. 199-217; and Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 
1979).
 ^Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, p.201.
® Ibid.
balance threats * The degree to which a state threatens others is not exclusively 
determined by its material capabilities (population, economic, industrial and military 
resources), as suggested by the balance of power approach, but it is also affected by 
its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.^
The debate about alliance formation is also focused on the issue of how states 
choose sides in a conflict, in short on the dichotomy between balancing and 
bandwagoning. The term “bandwagoning” as a description of international alliance 
behavior first appeared in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics. I n  his 
structural model of balance-of-power theory. Waltz uses “bandwagoning” to serve as 
the opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, 
balancing means allying with the weaker side.*'
The balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy, as two distinct hypotheses about 
how states will select their alliance partners in the face of a rising threat, is endorsed 
and further developed by Walt. Indeed, he declares that his use of the terms 
balancing and bandwagoning follows that of Kenneth Waltz; nevertheless, he 
redefines bandwagoning as “alignment with the source of danger” . In his theory of 
balance of threat, Walt argues that the tendency of bandwagoning can be motivated 
by defensive reasons (to appease the dominant power), offensive reasons (to profit, 
directly or indirectly, from the victory of the dominant power), or by a combination 
of both of them.'^ Walt forcefully argues that balancing is, empirically, the dominant
 ^ See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
“ As Walt points out, “states balance against the states that pose the greatest threat, and the latter need 
not to be the most powerful states in the system. Ibid, p.263 
 ^Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.22-26.
' “ Kenneth Walt?, credits the term of Stephen Van Evera, see Theory o f International Politics, p. 126
'' I*’·«!·
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p. 17.
1.1 Ibid, pp. 19-47.
response to external threats,'"* and bandwagoning is almost always confined to weak 
and isolated states.'^ Bandwagoning is risky because it requires trust and increases 
the resources available to the threatening power: today’s ally can always turn to be 
tomorrow’s enemy. Joining the weaker side (balancing) prevents the emergence o f a 
hegemon that could threaten the independence o f all.'^
Taking into account Walt’s “neorealist” orientation, it is rather surprising that 
the variable o f system structure plays little role in his analysis. He underplays the 
importance of structural differences by believing that his generalizations are equally 
applicable to multipolar and bipolar systems. For example, we can argue that 
bandwagoning is logically more likely in a multipolar system than in a bipolar one. 
Balancing may be hindered in a multipolar system by ambiguity about which state 
poses the greatest threat. Bandwagoning is also encouraged by the thought that there 
are other targets toward which an aggressor’s energies may be directed and there are 
other potential allies that a state may call upon for help in the event that its 
aggressor-ally turns against it. Moreover, in multipolarity efficient balancing is 
inhibited because o f collective goods anxieties'^ and hopes that somebody else will 
do the job; a pathology known as “buck-passing”. According to the logic of “passing
Walt: “balancing is far more common than bandwagoning”. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 
p.l48. Moreover, in the conclusion of his analysis about the alliance policies of Iran, Turkey, India 
and Pakistan, he stresses that “the lesson is clear: balancing is the preferred response to external 
threats”, Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest Asia”, 
International Organization 42:2 (1988), p.308.
Walt: “In general, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than 
balance...States will also be tempted to bandwagon when allies are simply unavailable”, Stephen Walt,
The Ori^ns o f Alliances, pp.29-30.
In Waltz’s words: “secondary states, if  they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the 
stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, 
provided, of course, that the coalition they form achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to 
dissuade adversaries from attacking”, Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, pp. 126-7.
In the now classic “An Economic Theory o f Alliances”, Review of Economics and Statistics 48: 
266-279 (1966), Olson and Zeckhauser (p.267) argued that public, or collective, goods and services 
(e.g., deterrence) which (1) cannot feasibly be withheld from nonpurchasers or nonproducers and (2) 
if  available to one member of the group can be made available to others without cost or at marginal
the buck” some states -  unwilling to share the costs of stopping a rising hegemon or 
because they expect their position to be strengthened by keeping itself out from the 
war -  may feel an incentive to stand aside if warfare occurs in hopes that some other 
state will face the aggressor. In short, they may try to free ride on other states’ 
balancing efforts. Inevitably, the balancing process becomes inefficient since the 
aggressor is given “the chance to overturn the balance by eliminating the system’s 
opposing poles through piecemeal aggression”.** The other pathology affecting 
balancing in multipolarity is caused by the phenomenon o f “chain-ganging”. Given 
the anarchic setting and the relative equality o f alliance partners that characterize a 
multipolar system, each member-state feels that its own security is integrally 
intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. In such a scenario, chaining 
occurs when nations are dragged into a war in order to save reckless allies because 
they fear that the demise of the latter would decisively affect the security of each of 
them.*^ States chaining themselves unconditionally to reckless allies threaten the 
stability of the system “by causing unrestrained warfare that threatens the survival of 
some o f the great power that form the system’s poles’’.^ ** In a bipolar system, 
bandwagoning is less likely not only because of the virtual certainty that the super 
power protector will continue to balance off the superpower threat but also because 
the threat itself is less ambiguous.
Several scholars point out that Walt’s study-span is severely curtailed 
because of the defensive bias characterizing his perspective, which views all
costs. In short, some alliance members may be tempted to obtain the benefits of the collective good 
(e g., deterrence) without paying their fair share.
'** Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance 
Patterns in Multipolarity”, International Organization 44:2 (1990), p.l41.
Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, pp. 167-170.
Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alhance 
Patterns in Multipolarity”, p. 141.
alliances as responses to “threat”. Apart from the bandwagoning type, offensive 
alliances are absent in his scheme: as Schweller points out “alliances are responses 
not only to threats but also to opportunities” ,^’ In this regard, it is interesting to 
notice that despite the fact that many realist scholars have usually distinguished 
between “imperialistic and status-quo power”, or “satisfied or unsatisfied powers”, or 
“revolutionary and status-quo states”, both realism and neorealism suffer from a 
status-quo bias in their interpretation of alliance policies,“
Randall Schweller is one of the scholars who bases the analysis on the 
distinction between status-quo powers and revisionist states by arguing that 
“generally, revisionist powers are the prime movers of alliance behavior; status-quo 
states are the reactors” .^  ^ According to Schweller the main problem o f the critiques 
raised about Walt’s arguments is their acceptance of his assumptions that 1) alliances 
are the outcome of a threat - whether domestic or external and 2) bandwagoning is 
interpreted as capitulation.
In contrast, Schweller points out that bandwagoning should be interpreted as 
the alignment not with the state posing a threat but with the stronger one; moreover, 
the promise for rewards rather than the threat of punishment motivates a state to 
bandwagon. However, Schweller acknowledges that the desire for profit is not the 
unique explanation for bandwagoning, states may ally with the stronger side -  either 
as “jackal bandwagoning”, whose goal is profit (to share the spoils of victory), or 
“piling-on bandwagoning”, that usually takes place at the end of wars when “states
Randall Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Walt’s Balancing 
Proposition”, American Political Science Review 91:4 (1997), p.928.
See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace.
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, 
International Security 19:1 (1994), p. 105.
bandwagon with the victor to claim an unearned share o f the spoils” -  because of 
fear.^^
As observed so far, almost all scholars interested in the question of alliance 
formation have coined ad-hoc terminology (terms/defmitions) in order to distinguish
their specific theories from the other. Schweller follows the trend and calls his theory
26as “balance-of-interests” .
Schweller argues that “the most important determinant of alignment is the 
compatibility o f political goals, not the imbalances of power or threat” .^  ^
Accordingly, if one state is pleased with the status quo it will join the coalition 
defending the systemic equilibrium, even if it is the stronger one. On the other hand, 
a revisionist state aimed at “profit” rather than security will align with a rising 
expansionist state or a coalition that seeks to overthrow the status quo.^ ** In short, 
according to Schweller, a state’s alliance behavior is not necessarily determined by 
the presence of an external threat but by opportunities for gain and for profit.
This theory is able, according to its author, to explain alliance formations 
both at the state and at systemic levels. The former refers to “the costs a state is 
willing to pay to defend its value relative to the costs a state is willing to pay to 
extend its values”. In this way, Schweller distinguishes among four different kinds 
of states: 1) The “Lions”, states satisfied with the status-quo that are willing to pay a 
high price to protect what they possess; 2) The “Wolves”, which consider their
Walt writes that “bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state n ^ e s  
asynunetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role”. Stephen Walt, 
“Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest Asia”, p.282.
Schweller. “Aside from the desire to acquire additional territory, the motivation for jackal 
bandwagoning may also be security from the lion itself’. “Contrariwise, states may pile on because 
they fear the victors will pimish them if  they do not actively side against the losers”. Randall 
Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, p.94,95.
“  Ibid, p.99.
Ibid, p.88.
Ibid, p.93.
situation as intolerable and, therefore, are willing to pay an high price to subvert the 
status-quo; 3) the “Jackals”, unsatisfied free-riders ready to trail “Wolves” or 
“Lions” who are on the verge of a victory; 4) the “Lambs”, willing to pay low costs 
for their defense or their expansion, which are usually suspected of bandwagoning 
because of fear.
At the systemic level, balance-of-interests theory suggests that the 
distribution of capabilities, by itself, does not determine the stability o f the system. 
More significant are the objectives and means to which those capabilities or 
influence are put to use. Schweller asserts that when the states pleased with the status 
quo are stronger than the revisionist states, the system will be stable.^®
However, Schweller’s conclusions about the systemic level neglect 
completely one of the core-points of structural realism, the argument that broad 
outcomes of international politics derive more from the structural constraints of the 
states system than from unit behavior. Waltz argues that the interactions o f major 
actors -the number of poles -  select and socialize states to a particular form of 
behavior. In other words, it determines what types o f international behavior will be 
rewarded and punished and, therefore, what types of foreign policy will seem 
prudent to actors in the system. This is clearly in contradiction with Schweller’s 
emphasis on the role of states’ motivations in shaping their foreign policies, which 
leads him to explain systemic effects (i.e. stability) uniquely in the light of the
Ibid29
Schweller defines status-quo powers as the states that “seek self-preservation and the protection of 
values they already possess; they are security maximizers, not power-maximizers”. In contrast, 
“revisionist states value what they covet more that what they currently possess...they will employ 
military force to change the status quo and to extend their values”. Ibid, pp. 104-105.
preferences of the units composing the system and disregards the impact of systemic 
factors.^*
In short, Schweller says that bandwagoning is the policy of the state that has 
not much to lose but something, or much, to gain; balancing is the policy of the state 
that has not much to gain but much to lose. Rather that being opposite behaviors, 
balancing and bandwagoning are associated with opposite systemic conditions: 
balancing with stasis, bandwagoning with two phases of a system in flux -  the rise of 
Wolves that attracts, for different reasons, the Jackals and the Lambs (i.e. the end of 
a war and the linked phenomenon of piling on the winning coalitions).
Following this analysis, mainly focused of W alt’s balance of threat theory 
and on Schweller’s balance of interests theory, one question emerges: How to 
articulate the causal linkage that drives states’ alliance policy? Walt’s theory focuses 
on the concept of threat, which can drive a state to ally against, as well as, together 
with the state that constitutes the threat. How can the same cause lead to two 
outcomes so different? Are the strength of the state and the availability of allies the 
only factors determining states’ alliance choices as suggested by Walt? Schweller, on 
the other hand, argues that “positive sanctions (i.e. profit) are the most effective 
means to induce bandwagoning behavior”^^  but also admits that fear may precipitate 
the decision to align with the stronger side. Hence, what drives states’ alliance 
policy? Profit or fear?
As Glenn Snyder put it: “Alliances should also be placed in the context of system structure and 
process. Systemic anarchy is one stimulus to ally, although not always a sufficient one. Structural 
polarity - how military power and potential are distributed among major states - has important effects 
on the nature of alliances and alliance politics”. Glenn Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neo-Realist First 
Cut”, Journal of International Affairs 44:1 (1990), p. 107.
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, p. 107.
Ibid, p.88.
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Allying with a threatening state may be also motivated by different 
phenomena than the ones indicated by Walt and Schweller: states may choose to ally 
with adversaries in order to contain threats emanating from one another.^'* Patricia 
Weitsman labels this dynamic tethering. Tethering differentiates itself from 
bandwagoning because: 1) it implies a compromise from a position of strength rather 
than capitulation or appeasement; and 2) it involves reciprocal threats rather than 
asymmetrical threat as it is the case with bandwagoning.
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the dichotomy 
balancing/bandwagoning, which is endorsed by both Walt and, albeit to a lesser 
extent, by Schweller, obscures the full range o f choices within the alliance realm and 
inhibits a more discriminating analysis. In reality, there are many ways to 
accommodate a threatening state besides allying with or against it: the choices 
available are not strictly restricted to the ones implied in the drastic alternative “with 
the stronger, or against the stronger” . As suggested by Schroeder, this could take 
various forms: declaring neutrality, whether formal or informal; approaching other 
states on one or both sides to improve relations, but short of alliance; trying to 
withdraw into isolation; and conciliating and compromising with the threatening 
state without capitulating and joining that power in order to keep options open and
The cornerstone of this argument is provided by Paul Schroeder’s article “AlUances, 1815-1945; 
Weapons of power and Tools o f Management” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions o f National 
Security, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp.227-262.
Patricia Weitsman, “Intimate Enemies; The Politics of Peacetime Alhes”, Security Studies 7:1 
(1997), p. 157.
Weitsman recognizes that her argument is built on Schroeder, but she argues that the pacts analyzed 
in her article are among states posing a grave threat to them in the international system, rather than 
pacts forming among relatively friendly states. Ibid, p. 163.
Walt has subsequently relaxed the dichotomy. Balancing and bandwagoning are ideal types which 
actual behavior only approximates: “balancing against a potential threat does not require unremitting 
hostility to it”. See Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest 
Asia”, p.315.
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gain time.^* Indeed, reconciliation, even if precarious, may allow the preservation of 
some autonomy that, on the other hand, would necessarily be jeopardized by forming 
an alliance with the stronger.^^ These externally oriented conciliating strategies may 
also be accompanied by internal balancing efforts (arming): many combinations o f 
balancing and conciliation are conceivable, as diplomatic history makes abundantly
clear 40
1.3 Approaches based on internal security:
Deborah Larson suggests that in order to better grasp the question of when 
states bandwagon it is necessary to abandon the systemic level o f analysis in favour 
of focusing on the domestic scene of the countries that decide to ally with the greater 
powers '" Empirically, in her analysis, she refers to the behavior of the small Central 
and Eastern European powers towards Germany in the 1930s. By adopting what she 
defines as an “institutionalist approach” and positing that the élites ruling a state 
want, in the first instance, to keep their hold on power and do not necessarily act both 
in order to protect the territorial integrity and to increase the power of the state, she 
concludes that “alignment with a potential hegemon helps a weak regime to retain 
authority in a variety of ways -  by putting an end to external subversion.
Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945. Weapons of power and Tools of Management”, pp.l IT­
US.
A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies, 
and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against making alliances with strong 
states except by necessity. The Prince, Chapter 21
For example, it is wrong to suggest that Britain, Franceand Russia in the late 1930s were 
“appeasing” instead of “balancing”: they did both. While underreacting to the threat posed by Hitler, 
they were also building-up their arsenals. As Christensen and Snyder argue, “Appeasement is a 
diplomatic strategy that can either accompany or preclude balancing sUrategies, in the same way that 
“talking tough” and leveling coercive threats can accompany or preclude taking concrete measures to 
improve one’s power position in the world”, Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Progressive 
Research on Degenerate Alliances”, American Political Science Review 91:4 (1997), p. 921.
See Deborah Larson, “Bandawagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality” in R. 
Jervis and J. Snyder, ed.. Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition 
in the Eurasian Rimland, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
12
undermining the political position of domestic rivals, providing them with a source 
of economic assistance and an aura of invincibility by association with the great 
power’s victories” .'*^
In short, worried about their own political survival, the dominating élites of a 
weak state are not in the position to face an hegemonic threat and, consequently, they 
are more likely to align (bandwagoning) with a threatening state to prolong their 
position in p o w e rT a k in g  into account Larson’s focus on the domestic structure of 
states, it is somehow surprising that she does not pay any attention to the different 
types of political regime that ruled the Eastern and Central European states in the 
1930s. Moreover, Larson’s argument that bandwagoning alliance behavior is 
associated to “weak states” does not challenge at all balance-of-threat theory’s 
explanation of alliance formation. Walt’s theory predicts that states with illegitimate 
leaders, weak governmental institutions, and/or little ability to mobilize economic 
resources are weak states likely to bandwagon: “the weaker the state, the more likely 
it is to bandwagon rather than balance” .'*^
Besides, in Larson’s analysis what is missing is exactly what she intends to 
explain: the link between the weak domestic position o f the ruling élites and the 
choice to ally with the source of the threat. Why should the leaders facing difficulties 
decide in that direction? Why can the guarantees that the élites are pursuing only be 
provided by an expansionist and aggressive state?
The intrinsic domestic weakness of the elite in Third World countries and 
their alignment decisions are the object of the studies carried out by Steven David 45
Ibid, p. 103.
Ibid, p.l02. Specifically, Larson measures the strength of a state not only by its size and capabilities 
but also by its level of institutional identity and elite legitimacy.
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.29.
See Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics (1991), pp.233-256.
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Because of their lack of legitimacy and consensus, Third World countries leaders’ 
main aim is to ensure their political and physical survival, which is far more likely to 
be challenged by internal threats (with or without external backing) than from 
external th rea ts.A cco rd ing  to David, the necessity to consolidate their domestic 
position pushes the ruling elite to assume an appeasing stance toward eventual 
external threats,'*^ especially toward the countries that support subversive groups, 
with the aim o f conserving strength to be used to counter the more immediate and 
dangerous internal threats. What superficially appears as bandwagoning is in reality 
balancing: the accommodation towards the secondary external threat is instrumental 
for conserving strength for the battle against the primary domestic menace.'** 
Alignment decisions are taken by authoritarian leaders with the goal o f preserving 
their power rather than serving state interest: leaders prefer to align with states that 
ensure their hold on power rather than with states that may increase their power, but 
at the risk of endangering their survival. In short, it is the leadership of the state and 
not the state itself that is the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding Third 
World alignment. David calls the theory that emerges from these observations 
“omnibalancing”.
In essence, David's theory of “omnibalancing” is not in contradiction with the 
traditional balance of power logic, rather, it asserts that “realism must be broadened 
to examine internal threats in addition to focusing on external threats and capabilities
For a detailed discussion of why internal threats are so common in the Third World see Mohammed 
Ayoob, “Security in the Third World: The Worn about to Turn?”, International Affairs 60 (1983/84).
Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, p.236.
“Omnibalancing is thus not misled into concluding that bandwagoning to threatening states 
necessarily means that the leadership choose to balance against the most pressing threats it faced”. 
Ibid, p.245.
David argues that “it [omnibalancing] incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary 
adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in 
power. This theory rests on the assumptions that leaders are weak and illegitimate...It assumes that
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(that is, structural arguments), and that the leader o f the state rather than the state 
itself should be used as the level o f analysis” .^ *’
An additional explanation, largely complementary with David’s 
omnibalancing theory, that highlights the role of state-society relations in shaping 
the state’s security policies is provided by Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, in their 
studies on Egypt's foreign policy between 1962 and 1973 and Third World security.^* 
More specifically, these two scholars analyze domestic events in order to highlight 
the incentives to conclude external alignments. First, a state facing an external threat 
may not be able to mobilize its domestic resources in order to increase its ability to 
cope with the danger. Second, a policy o f external alignment may be preferred over 
the option of internal mobilization if internal threats to the government are more 
salient than external ones. In this situation, which is frequent in Third World 
countries,^^ by pursuing a policy o f alliance the ruling élites try to secure the material 
resources necessary to deal with internal threats.
In this way, the pursued policy o f alliance is not a mere function of the 
presence or absence of external threats (a systemic variable), but is also linked to the 
“domestic objectives of state actors and the social, economic, and political 
constraints that limit the availability o f resources in society and the governments’
the most powerful determinant of alignment is the drive of Third World leaders to ensure their 
political and physical survival”, Ibid, p.236.
Ibid, p.237.
Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case of 
Egypt, 1962-73”, International Organization 45:3 (1991), pp.369-395; Michael Barnett and Jack 
Levy, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security”, The Jerusalem 
Journal o f International Relations 14:4 (1992), pp. 19-40.
“  “It has become commonplace among those who study Third World politics that political leaders 
tend to perceive the central threats to state security as deriving more from domestic than foreign 
sources”, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and 
Third World Security”, p.24.
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access to those resources at acceptable costs. . . Facing a security threat, Third 
World countries may turn to alliance formation because: 1) they simply lack the 
resources to support an arming program; 2) an extraction of domestic resources may 
weaken the long-term strength of the economy and therefore the security of the state; 
3) heavy military expenditures may affect the process o f distribution of resources 
within the government partners and therefore undermine the ruling élites’ narrow 
base of political support; and 4) domestic threats to the political stability o f the 
government may force the leaders to look for the necessary material resources to 
placate or suppress the internal unrest by concluding an alliance.^'*
The relationship between alliances and arming as two distinct strategies to 
counter an external threat has been discussed at length by several authors. On the one 
side, there are authors denying, on empirical basis, that there is a relation between 
internal balancing (arming) and external balancing (allying).”  On the other side, 
others have developed microeconomic interpretative schemes aimed at explaining 
why in some cases states choose to undertake an arming program, and in other cases 
they decide to form an a l l i an ce .T h e  choice, according to these models, is made by 
the balance of costs and benefits of each option; thus, states will decide in favour of 
the alternative that provides additional security at a lower domestic cost.^^
Michael Bamett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case of 
Egypt, 1962-73”, p.395.
Ibid, pp. 375-377.
See the analysis by Benjamin Most and Randolph Siverson, “Substituting Arms and Alliances, 
1870-1914: An Exploration In Comparative Foreign Policy” in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and 
James Rosenau, eds, New Directions in the Study o f Foreign Policy, (Boston: Allen & Uwin, 1987), 
pp. 131-160.
See Michael Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally; A Theory and Test”, Western Political Quarterly 38:4 
(1984), pp.523-44.; and James Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security”, 
International Organization 47:2 (1993), pp.207-233.
One caveat here: The question of autonomy versus security benefits in alUances is not addressed 
here because it is a consequence and not a cause of alliances; this chapter considers only the primary 
phase of alliance formation and not the secondary one after alliances have formed. On autonomy costs 
generally, see James Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), pp.904-933.
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More specifically, James Morrow argues that even if systemic factors 
(magnitude of external threat) play a role, the choice between the available 
alternatives to meet a state’s security needs is determined by both their internal costs 
and their external benefit. A policy is chosen according to its ability to face an 
external threat and to provide domestic support; without domestic consensus, 
security policies will fail to counter a threat. As Morrow puts it, “Efficiency of a 
policy is not measured solely in terms of the security added. Instead, the benefits in 
security from a change in policy must be measured against the cost of overcoming 
domestic opposition to the change” .^ * The greater the resistance, the costlier the 
policy. According to Morrow, states choose the combination o f arming and allying 
within a contest delimited by the internal political costs and external benefits o f each 
option.
However, in reality, in the external environment a state does not have many 
possibilities to choose: to form an alliance it is necessary to find another state willing 
to do it, and this is not always the case for reasons which are well beyond the 
domestic politics of the state looking for allies. Because of the possibility that allies 
are simply unavailable and/or unable to communicate,^^ it is awkward to speculate, 
as Morrow does, on the idea that alliance and arming provide alternate paths nations 
can pursue when faced with an external threat. In short. Morrow’s thesis should be 
interpreted as a warning not to underestimate the role and weight of domestic
James Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies. Trade-offs in the Search for Security”, p.216. Also C. 
Lambom discusses the political costs, measured as internal and external risks, created by different 
strategies of extraction in his book, The Price o f Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France 
and Germany, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991)
As suggested by Walt (1987), “ ...a further prerequisite for balancing is an effective system of 
diplomatic communication. The ability to communicate enables potential allies to recognize their 
shared interests and coordinate their responses”, Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.30.
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factors^” on alliances formation but it does not constitute a successful alternative 
theory able to conjugate coherently domestic and international politics.
1.4 The Other Sources of Alliances:
So far, we have discussed the hypothesis regarding alliances formation in two 
broad categories. The first emphasizes the predominance on external factors, the 
second stresses the role of domestic factors; anyway, both approaches are focused on 
the main rationale of countering a threat. However, there are other elements that we 
should take into account in our analysis.
Liska suggests that alliances may serve two other functions: to keep an 
international equilibrium by restraining an exuberant (destabilizing) ally (Liska calls 
it as “interallied control function”) and to legitimize or strengthen a regime by its 
international recognition.*' In this regard, it is interesting to notice that Liska 
indicates these two functions of alliances without differentiating between greater and 
lesser powers.
Following a similar approach, Robert Rothstein distinguishes between 
military (close to the aggregation of power model) and political alliances. The latter 
are undertaken with the purpose of influencing a restless ally, and, to a certain extent, 
to restrain its behavior: they emerge from the perception o f a situation, and not of a
“  This is coherent with Morrow’s assertions that “alliance strategies cannot be studied apart from 
military allocations: the choice between the two is decided by the balance of costs and benefits of 
each” and that “because arms and alliance policies have both domestic and international 
consequences, they cannot be considered separately”, James Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade­
offs in the Search for Security”, p.208, 213.
Goerge Liska, Nations in Alliance. The Limits o f Interdependence, pp. 30-39.
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threat that could not dealt with unilaterally, that can be exploited exactly by an 
alliance.^^
Similarly, Paul Schroeder criticizes the widespread perception of alliances as 
“weapons of power” to which he proposes an alternative explanation based on the 
idea of alliances as “tools of management” . B y  analyzing the most important 
alliances between 1815 and 1945, Schroeder argues that all alliances work, to a 
certain extent, as pacta de contrahendo, since they constrain and control the actions 
of the allies. By viewing alliances as pact of mutual control, he comes to the 
conclusion that peace is better guaranteed by an international system composed by 
states tied by strict alliances. Despite the major emphasis on the cooperative 
phenomenon entailed by alliances, Schroeder’s thesis can be interpreted through a 
strictly realist perspective. Indeed, he brings our attention to a crucial fact that 
Realism, because of its insistence on the balance-of-power, has missed: conflict and 
competition are also present within an alliance. This is perfectly coherent with 
realism: despite their cooperative outlook, alliances are also plagued by the 
unceasing competition among the member-states.
Security, on which much emphasis is placed, may concern not only the 
physical survival of the state but also the defense of its political principles. Thus, it is 
plausible to suggest that the alignment between ideologically alike states is “natural” 
and that commonality o f  values and principles constitutes a good reason for 
alignment. However, most of the studies regarding alliances, especially the ones 
linked to the realist and neo-realist schools of thought, are inclined to limit
“  Robert Rothstein , Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 
49-53
“  Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of power and Tools of Management”.
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drastically the role of ideology in alliance choices.*''* The most articulated critique on 
the role of ideology had been carried out by Walt. In the conclusions of his studies on 
alliance formation in the Middle East (1955-79) and Southwest Asia, Walt stresses 
that ideology plays relatively little role in determining alliance preferences and that, 
in any case, the slight preference for alignment, spurred by ideological similarity, 
showed by the states examined “was readily abandoned in the face of significant 
threats” .**^ Though the initial hypotheses of his analysis are neither very clear nor 
always persuasive,^^ Walt argues that; 1) only the states already ‘Tairly secure” are 
more likely to follow ideological preferences in their alliance choices; and 2) the 
impact of ideology is greater in a bipolar world and, particularly, when states’ 
defense capabilities are superior to their offensive potential. Yet, if defense is 
predominant over offence why states should look for allies. Only because of 
ideological solidarity?
Moreover, Walt postulates that there is a link between weak or unstable 
regimes and the alliances concluded in order to bolster their legitimacy. The example 
chosen by Walt (i.e. Cuba’s alignment with the Communist block) does not appear to 
be appropriate at all. explaining Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union on mere 
ideological basis, as Walt does, neglects completely the sense of threat coming from 
the United States perceived by Fidel Castro.
According to Liska, conflict is more important than ideological affinity: “Alliances are formed 
primarily for security rather than out of a sense of community”, George Liska, Nations in Alliance. 
The Limits of Interdependence, p. 11-12.
“  Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.266. In the case of Southwest Asia the argument is even 
more marked: “These cases also suggest that ideology plays relatively little role in determining 
alliance preferences. In particular, alliances between dissimilar states (for example, Pakistan and 
China, the Soviet Union and India, the United States and Iran and Pakistan) were more common that 
alliances among states sharing similar domestic orders. See Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of 
Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest Asia”,p.313.
Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, pp.33-40.
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Paradoxically, Walt’s theoretical framework and observations o f alliance 
patterns in the Middle East are utilized by Michael Barnett in order to assert that state 
identity offers theoretical leverage over the issue of the construction of the threat and 
the choice o f the alliance partner. According to Barnett, looming large in Walt’s 
analysis is “ideology”, specifically, Arabism. By arguing that Arabism shaped the 
identity and the policies available to Arab leaders, Barnett concludes that Arabism 
imprinted its mark on inter-Arab security dynamics and alliance politics. More 
specifically, he points out that identity explains/influences alliance dynamics in two 
different ways; 1) it provides theoretical leverage over the construction of the threat 
(a shared identity is likely to generate a shared definition o f the threat); 2) it provides 
a handle on who is considered to be a desiderable alliance partner (identity makes 
some partners more attractive than others).^**
While Barnett’s theoretical argument is well formulated, the historical 
evidence that he put forward to endorse his thesis gives, somehow ironically, rather 
more credit to Walt’s conclusions than to the contention that identity offers important 
insights into the dynamic of security cooperation and alliance politics in the Middle 
East. The case of the Baghdad Pact, chosen by Barnett as a historical case 
corroborating his thesis, vividly illustrates how states -  Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain 
and (informally) the US -  having different ideological preferences formed an alliance 
to defend Western interests against the Soviet threat and allow some of its members 
(i.e. Iraq and Great Britain) to retain their shrinking influence in the region. The 
second case suggested by Barnett is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
arrangement of 1981 that constitutes undoubtedly an example of an alliance scheme
Michael Barnett, ‘identity and Alliances in the Middle East” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture 
o f National security. Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press 
1996), pp.400-447.
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“based on ideational factors, a shared history, and a similar political profile” .^  ^ Yet, 
what seems apparently as an ideological alliance is a form of balancing behavior by 
the Gulf conservative monarchies against the threat, both ideological and military, 
posed by revolutionary Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The loose alignment among 
the GCC states strikingly resembles the various pacts among Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and monarchical Iraq “intended to counter the threat from the aggressive 
revolutionary nationalism espoused by leaders such as Nasser” .^ *’
Finally, regarding the US-Israeli relationship -  the last historical case 
scrutinized -  Barnett argues that the “US-Israeli relation is dependent upon Israel’s 
having a particular identity”, an assertion that exceedingly oversimplifies the 
strategic cooperation existing between the two countries.^* The uniqueness of the 
relations between the US and Israel is well exemplified by the fact that both states 
have never signed a military alliance: because of the identical interests there has 
never been a question that the US would provide military assistance to Israel in a 
crisis. As suggested by Morrow, “Their military interests have been sufficiently 
similar that an alliance has been unnecessary” .^ ^
In short, Barnett’s thesis does not constitute an alternative approach for 
understanding security politics and security cooperation but rather a complementary 
approach, which highlights one of the “particular” interests of states (i.e. identity) 
that reduces the indeterminacy characterizing the bargaining process of alliance
“  Ibid, p.446.
Ibid, p.446.
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.267.
Since the end of the 1967 War, Israel has been almost entirely dependent on the US as its source of 
strategic support, which includes, among many other things, annualy $1.8 in US military assistance. 
As Ed Blanche argues, “Israel’s relationship with the USA is a crucial element in its policy-making 
and critical to its military capabilities”, in idem, “Israel addresses the threats of the new milleimiiun”, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review 11 (February 1999), p.26.
James Morrow, “Alliances and Assimetry: An Alternative to the Capabihty Aggregation Model”, 
American Journal o f Political Science, 35:4 (1991), p.907.
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formation in a multipolar system. As demonstrated by Snyder, the security dilemma 
creates a general incentive to ally with some other state or states but theoretically it is 
impossible to predict who will align with whom. This indeterminacy is reduced by 
the existing pattern of conflicts and commonalities -  stemming from ideological, 
ethnic or economic values -  among states, which affects the bargaining process by 
predisposing the system toward certain alliances against others.^“* Previously, 
Morgenthau had suggested a similar argument by stating that “The ideological factor, 
when it is superimposed upon an actual community o f interests, can lend strength to 
the alliance by marshaling moral convictions and emotional preferences to its
73
support” .75
For this argument, see Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, World Politics 
36:4 (1984), pp.461-495.
As Snyder suggests, “Particular conflicts or affinities of interest establish a tacit pattern of 
alignment, prior to or apart from any overt alliance negotations”. Ibid, p.464.
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, p.204.
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CHAPTER II
TURKEY AND ISRAEL IN THE “PERIPHERAL ALLIANCE”
Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey's relationship with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors has been awkward, if not overtly hostile. The collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire left a legacy o f territorial grievances, historic resentments, 
political tensions and mutual suspicions which neither the Turks nor the Arabs have 
so far overcome.’  ^Despite its geographical position, Turkey decided to isolate itself 
from developments in the Middle East and adopted a very cautious and hands-off 
approach to the region, Ideologically, Turkey’s separation from the Middle East was 
largely the result of Atatiirk’s determination to turn the Turkish republic into a 
modern and Westernized state, which could defend its territorial integrity and 
political independence against external aggression and could become an equal 
member o f the Western world of nations.
As Philip Robins points out, the main features of Turkey’s foreign policy 
toward the Middle East have been strict adherence to the principles o f non­
interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of 
all countries in the region, and to the development of bilateral political and economic 
relations with as many states in the region as possible. However, the most striking 
characteristic of Ankara’s Middle East policy has always been its subordination to 
Turkey’s relations with the Western states, Turkey’s political, cultural, military and
As Rouleau put it, “Seventy years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a mutual suspicion - 
largely unfounded - persists. The former rulers have not forgotten what they saw as the Arab 
“betrayal” of rallying to the British during World War 1 to gain their independence. The fomier 
subject peoples have not forgotten the centuries of Ottoman rule and the harsh repression that 
followed the emergence of their national movements and some Arabs suspect Ankara of harboring 
Ottoman ambitions” in Eric Rouleau “The Challenges to Turkey’, Foreign Affairs 72:5 (November- 
December 1993), p. 115.
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economic alignment with the West is undoubtedly the chief factor conditioning 
Turkish-Arab relations.^* Hence, it is not surprising that Ankara has historically seen 
its relations with the Middle East as an extension of its pro-Western policy. 
Moreover, as Kemal Karpat suggests, “this pro-Western foreign policy gave new 
impetus to Turkish urge for cultural and ideological identification with the West, 
which in turn increased its commitments [towards the West]” .’^
The ultimate aim o f Turkey’s foreign policy behavior towards the Middle 
East since World War II has been to minimize any danger to its security and 
independence and to its Western-focused agenda. As a consequence, Turkey has not 
been able to build so far a solid, reliable, working relationship with any of its 
southern or eastern Muslim neighbors. Rather, historically Ankara’s relations with 
the Middle Eastern countries have been characterized by open hostility in the case of 
Syria and, albeit to a lesser extent, Iraq; permanent distrust in the case of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia; and lack of substance in the relations with Egypt and Jordan.
Against this background, the essential correctness that has always 
characterized Turkish-Israeli relations stands in sharp contrast, remarking the cultural 
affinity and political affinity that they both share together with the “common sense of 
otherness”*” in a region dominated by Arabs and non-democratic regimes. In other 
words, because of their common deep attachment to the West and Western values.
Robins Philip: Turkey and the Middle East (London: Pinter for Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991), fT>. 65-67.
Kemal Karpat, “Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations” in Idem, ed , Turkey’s Foreign Policy in 
Transition, 1959-74, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.l08.
Ibid p. 114. . . .
Alan Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations. A Turkish ‘Periphery Strategy’? in Henri Barkey, ed.,
Turkey's Role in the Middle East, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 169.
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which is unique in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel find themselves having to exist 
in a region where “they feel profoundly ill at ease” .*'
Yet, despite their common ground -  the pro-Western foreign policy 
orientation, the commitment to democracy and secularism and similar economic 
interests -  the relations between Turkey and Israel have fluctuated historically 
between intense cooperation and almost imperceptible interaction. Accordingly, the 
decisive factors influencing the relations revolve around regional*^ and global 
developments.
Indeed, it was mainly due to US pressure that Ankara granted, in March 1949, 
de-facto recognition to the Jewish State of Israel.*^ Twelve months later diplomatic 
relations were established.*'* While the Turkish government explained its decision to 
recognize Israel through a strictly legalist perspective by arguing that the recognition 
of a state which had already been admitted to the United Nations (UN) was a 
requirement of international law, it is possible to discern that the Turkish élites’ 
perception of Israel as an example o f a modern and Western state and their 
admiration for the strength demonstrated during the 1948 War presumably positively 
influenced Ankara.*^ In short, the Turkish policymakers saw the decision as a further
Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p.82.
The thesis that the decisive factor in the two countries’ relations revolves around developments in 
the Middle East is originally suggested by Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy 
Relations in the East Mediterranean, (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p.77.
Turkey initially refused to recognize the Jewish State. However, soon after, as Robins argues, 
“factors external to the region became primary in determining Turkish policy...In particular the 
urgency of Turkey’s need to court the US in the run-up to the creation of NATO took precedence over 
the situation on the ground”. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p.75.
Turkey recognized the State of Israel on March 28, 1949 and established diplomatic relations on 
March 9, 1950 by posting a Ministry plenipotentiary to Tel Aviv. Then, in 1952, Ambassadors were 
exchanged.
Mim Kemal Oke explains the Turkish elites’ favorable attitude towards Israel with the following 
reasons: “Israel’s military victories against her Arab neighbors and the various development plans she 
had successufully undertaken”. Quoted by Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Relations With Israel”, Foreign 
Policy (Ankara) 5:3-4 (1991), p.45.
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demonstration o f Turkey’s Westernness**^ and in clear opposition to the ostensibly 
neutralist position adopted by the Arab states in the East-West conflict.
On the other side, Israel immediately showed its eagerness*^ in further 
developing its ties with Turkey as part o f a more widely conceived “periphery 
strategy” -  devised by David Ben-Gurion -  in an effort to develop friends beyond the 
“Arab fence”. However, Israeli advances were met throughout most of the 1950s by 
a substantial ambivalence from Ankara, which was fostered by Turkey’s ties with the 
Arab states and, in particular, by the assignment -  given to Ankara by the US and 
Great Britain in exchange for Turkey’s membership in NATO*® -  to induce the Arab 
countries to adhere to regional defense pacts against the Soviet Union. Inevitably, the 
relations with Israel suffered, and Ankara did not hesitate to include in the Baghdad 
Pact (1955) a declaration stressing that the article relating to military assistance at 
times of crisis were valid for, and specifically linked to, the Palestinian problem. 
Moreover, in seeking other Arab states to join in the pro-Western defense treaties, 
Turkey pointed out repeatedly the limitations of its ties with Israel and its refusal to 
issue a declaration o f support for Israel’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.*’
Turkey’s ambivalence and hesitation towards improving its ties with Israel 
were suddenly swept away by new regional and international circumstances that 
pushed the two countries toward genuine cooperation. The growing instability that
86 Altemur Kıbç -  a former assistant to the Turkish representative to the UN -  wrote in 1959 that the 
decision was taken “as if  to emphasize her [Turkey’s] Westemness”. See Altemur, Kılıç Turkey and 
the IFoa-W (Washington, 1959).
Israeli’s marked interests towards Turkey is well exemplified by the fact that the Israeli authorities 
embarked in an active campaign aimed at persuading the Turks about their committment to confront 
the Communist threat: “Convincing the Turks that Israel was not ‘red’ almost assumed the status of a 
top national priority” indicates Arnikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in 
the East Mediterranean, p. 48.
“  According to Karpat, the British withdrew their objections to Turkey’s membership in NATO only 
after they were assured about Ankara’s support for the Middle East pact aimed at defending UK 
interests in the region. Kemal Karpat, “Turkish and Arab-lsraeli Relations”, p. 116.
Arnikam Nachmani, Avrac/, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean, p.67.
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characterized the Middle Eastern region in the second half of the 1950s, the 
increasing evidence o f Soviet-backed Communist and Nasserist subversion, the 
overthrowing of the allied pro-Western Hashemite regime in Iraq (1958) and the 
contemporaneous emergence of the US as the dominant Western power in the region 
pushed Turkey^” to hasten to join Israel in a secret “peripheral alliance”.
Before turning to analyze one of the most fhjitful periods in Israeli-Turkish 
relations and the several factors that led to it, a brief review of the historical relations 
between the Turks and the Jews provides useful insights about the sympathy that 
both nations have for each other and, consequently, a better understanding o f the 
relevant role played by ideational factors in the Turkish-Israeli relationship.
2.1 The Positive Historical Background:
“Israel will never forget that the Jews were accepted by the Ottoman Empire 
when they were expelled from various European countries some 500 years ago” said 
the Israeli President Ezer Weizman at his arrival in Turkey in 1994. Two years 
earlier, the Turkish Jewry had celebrated the 500*  ^ anniversary o f the arrival o f their 
forefathers at the Ottoman cities following Sultan Bayezid II’s decision to offer 
sanctuary to the Jews fleeing from the Spanish inquisition of 1492 and from other 
European countries later on. The Jews in the Ottoman state enjoyed special 
recognition as the third millet along with the Armenians and Orthodox Christians,
Foreign Minister Fatin Rii§tu’s statements during the events in Iraq and the Lebanese and Jordan 
crisis in 1958 emphasized the threat of “indirect aggression” created by Soviet-supported subversion 
in the region. As reported by Ali Karaosmanoglu, “Tinkey’s Security Policy : Continuity and Change” 
in D. Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern Region o f the Atlantic Alliance, (London: 
Macmillan, 1988), pp. 158-159.
The “Periphery doctrine” was designed to create the image, in the region and in the world at large, 
that the Middle East is not exclusively Arab or even Islamic but rather a multi-reUgious, ethnic, 
cultural, and national area. See Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel. Setting, Images 
and Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p.278.
SWB EE/1907 B/6, 28 January 1994.
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and this permitted them to preserve and continue their culture up to these days.^^ 
Since then, the Jewish community flourished along with the other religious/sectarian 
peoples to excel particularly in trade and industry. Several Jews also attained high 
positions in the courts of the Sultans, the most famous of whom was Joseph Nasi, the 
trusted confident of Selim II. In the closing yeas o f the Empire, despite the Ottoman 
government opposition to Zionism, as to all other forms of nationalism, this did not 
have anti-Jewish motivation and, in fact the bulk of the Jewish community in the 
country was not affected by the measures adopted against the Zionists.
While the Kemalists’ position vis-à-vis the Jewish community (and other 
minorities) was somewhat unclear during the War of Independence, it soon became 
evident that the Turkish Republic was strongly opposed to any manifestation of 
racism or anti-Semitism and was treating its Jews on an equal footing with other 
citizens. Mustafa Kemal’s fierce and determined reaction in the face of an attempt by 
an anti-Semitic group, in the summer of 1934, to force the Jews out o f several places 
in Thrace was acknowledged with praise by the Turkish Jewish community.^'^ He 
also welcomed thirty-five Jewish professors from Nazi Germany and offered them 
the opportunity to resume their academic work at Turkish universities. The positive 
attitudes and perceptions of the Jewish community in Palestine towards Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk were well captured in the articles published in the Hebrew press the 
day after his death on 10 November 1938. The newspaper Davar (World) wrote 
“Turkey has lost her founder and builder who restored her national youth, and 
humanity has lost one of the foremost and enlightened reformers o f the modern age”; 
similarly, Ha-Aretz (The Land) underlined that Atatürk was deservedly seen by many
93 For example, the Turkish Jewish community based in Istanbul publishes a magazine called “§alom” 
which is written in Ladino and Tiukish.
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as the greatest reformer of his time, and it was expected that his name would be 
eternally preserved in the history of the Turks and of the world.’^
Later on, the Istanbul offices of the Jewish Agency were allowed to organize 
the emigration to Palestine -  whether of the local community or of people in transit 
from Iran, Syria, Iraq and Bulgaria. As a result o f the emigration, nowadays, the 
number of Turkish Jews living in Israel is estimated at 120,000, most of them located 
in the coastal city of Bat Yam. According to Robins, this community is very active as 
a lobby on Turkey’s behalf because their sense of Turkish identity is very important 
to them.^^ The number of Jews in Turkey, predominantly concentrated in Istanbul, is 
around 24,000, but they are very influential, thanks to the wealth of the community 
and their historically prominent position in commercial life.
What is important to note is that historically speaking friendly relations 
between Turks and Jews prevailed, that as communities they never confronted each 
other, and apart from sporadic anti-Semitic statements from politicians linked to 
ultra-nationalist or Islamic parties, the Turks as a whole have always held their 
Jewish citizens in high regard. In plain words, as one Israeli scholar put it, 
“historically the Jews never suffered persecution in Turkey, and no Jewish blood had
97ever been spilled by the Turks’
See Kemai Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), endnote 51, p.268.
Davar, “Atatürk Met” (Atatürk is Dead), 11 November 1938. Ha-Aretz, “Atatürk”, 11 November 
1938. Both reported by David Kushner, “Mustafa Kemal and His Period in the Eyes of the Hebrew 
Press and Publications in Palestine”, International Journal o f Turkish Studies 3:2 (1985-86), pp.lOl- 
102.
Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p.85. In this regard, it should be pointed out that 
Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller during her visit to Israel in November 1994 joined in a sabbath 
meal organized by the community.
Arnikam Nachinani, Arac/, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean, p.45.
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2.2 1958: The Turkish-lsraeli Peripheral Pact:
The summer of 1958 found Israel and Turkey entering into an alliance, with 
an agreement for cooperation in the diplomatic, military and intelligence spheres, as 
well as in commerce and scientific exchanges. This was to become known as the 
“peripheral pact” . Besides their sense o f commonality, linked to their being non-Arab 
enclaves in a predominantly Arab Middle East and sharing a positive historical 
heritage, what were the predominant factors that pushed Turkey to take the Israeli 
offer o f a military alignment and what were the interests that Israel was seeking in 
including Turkey in its “peripheral strategy”?
From the Israeli perspective the matter appeared self-evident. Together with 
Iran, Turkey was the northern main pillar of David Ben-Gurion’s strategy to improve 
relations with non-Arab Middle Eastern countries. The importance attributed to 
Turkey, as a Muslim country bordering on the Arab states, was well illustrated by the 
accreditation in Ankara o f an Israeli military attaché -  one of four, the others serving 
at the Israeli embassies in London, Paris and Washington.
Turkey’s unique status was further fostered by the several military pacts in 
which it was involved, by 1954, Turkey belonged to three separate defense treaties: 
NATO, the Balkan Pact (with Greece and Yugoslavia) and an alliance with Pakistan. 
The year later Turkey became member o f another defense arrangement, the ill-fated 
Baghdad Pact. While Turkey’s activism towards Europe attracted and pleased Israel 
-  which unsuccessfully tried to become member o f the Balkan Pact -  Ankara’s 
opening towards the East, despite its evident anti-Soviet character, caused deep 
apprehensions in Jerusalem. For Israel, it was absolutely clear that while Turkey’s 
alignment with both Pakistan and Iraq were Western-backed alliances, and Israel
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would be strengthened by Turkey’s adherence to the Balkan Pact, and it would be 
weakened through Turkey’s approach to the East.^ **
While Turkey’s pact with Pakistan did not spark great concern in Israel, as it 
was merely attributed to Turkey’s total dependence upon the US and its consequent 
acquiescence to Washington’s requests and to Turkish Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes’s violent anti-communism and anti-Soviet stand,^^ Ankara’s alliance with 
Iraq significantly upset the Israelis. Israeli officials were worried that the arms 
provided to Iraq could find their way into anti-Western hands, or even worse, into 
anti-Israeli hands. Both possibilities could not be excluded, taking into account the 
presence in Iraq of a relatively powerful Communist movement and the country’s 
serious lack o f internal stability. The Israeli mistrust was so acute that it assumed 
elements of paranoia; in January 1955, a month before the actual conclusion of the 
Turkish-Iraqi mutual defense treaty, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Research 
Department considered the possibility o f the Turkish army aiding Iraq in the event of 
war against Israel.
Following the Suez War, Israel’s isolation in the international scenario 
increased considerably, in particular the confrontation with the Eisenhower 
administration over the 1956 intervention, along with France and Great Britain, 
against Egypt badly affected Israel’s relations with the dominant Western power. 
Consequently, Israel’s obsession to break out o f its international isolation reached a 
climax in order to overcome the impasse vis-à-vis the US, Israel hoped that by
98 p  y 2
Already in 1953, the Israeli Ambassador to Ankara cabled to the Israeli Foreign Ministry the 
following “The Turks adopt everything the Americans say. But we must not forget that there is 
scarcely a Turk in existence capable of distinguishing between Socialism and Communism”. As 
quoted by Nachmani,lbid, p.49.
Quoted by Nachmani, Ibid, p.74.
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allying with Turkey, the latter would undertake the assignment to act on Israel’s 
behalf in Washington, in particular by lobbying in favor of arms supplies to Israel.
Finally, the growing role of the Soviet Union in the region, as exemplified by 
the 1955 arms shipment to Egypt through Czechoslovakia, and the greater success o f 
Nasser’s attempts to extend his authority over other Arab countries, which 
culminated in the union between Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, named the 
United Arab Republic, provided additional incentives for Ben-Gurion’s collecting 
the call from Turkey and embarking in a secret trip to Ankara on August 29, 1958 
aimed at securing Menderes’ signature on the agreement.
Ankara’s motivations in joining Israel in a military cooperation arrangement 
were principally linked to the changed regional circumstances, to Moscow’s war o f 
nerves against Turkey and, albeit to a lesser extent, to the economic crisis that hit the 
country in the second half o f the 1950s. The predominant rationale for Turkey was to 
ease its way to the US administration by securing Israel’s support: the Turks were 
still convinced, despite the recent US-Israeli confrontation over the Suez 
intervention, that Israel could act as an advocate for Turkey’s interests in 
Washington. The British retreat from the Middle East and the launching of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957 clearly indicated to Ankara that the US was the 
new Western superpower in the region. As such, strengthening relations with it was 
simply an imperative for a country bordering with the Soviet Union and facing 
increasing isolation in the Middle East.
Moreover, as of 1956, the tide had begun to turn against the Democratic Party 
regime. As Criss points out, “Concurrent with major development projects was
Ibid, p.75. 
Ibid.
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mismanagement o f resources; bad weather and harvests eradicated benefits to be 
derived from massive purchases o f tractors for agriculture; trade and budget deficit 
had increased, the opposition began to be sharply critical; and the government 
became more authoritarian and oppressive” .C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  the US criticized 
Menderes’s mismanagement of economic assistance and its irresponsible spending, 
and negatively replied to the continuous requests for additional economic assistance 
that the Turkish authorities advanced in the second half o f the 1950s. Ankara was 
convinced that Turkey’s prospects of receiving US financial aid would improve 
greatly if  its request were backed by US Jewry, whose hearts it hoped to soften by 
way of closer relations with Jerusalem.
At the same time, Turkish-Russian relations, despite Moscow’s official 
withdrawal o f the 1945-46 demands for border changes and joint control o f the 
straits,*“  ^ were going through a new phase of tension. In September 1957, the Soviet 
Union started a war of nerves, backed up by troop movements in the Caucasus, 
against Turkey by accusing it o f planning an invasion o f Syria. Attributing the crisis 
and even Turkey’s role to “foreign circles”, the Soviets promised “great calamities” 
to be brought upon Turkey should it participate in a war against S y r i a . M o s c o w  
again manufactured a similar crisis in July 1958; in this case Turkey was accused of 
preparing an attack against Iraq, whose pro-Western regime had just been 
overthrown. Indeed, Kassem’s revolution in Iraq left the Baghdad Pact and Turkey in 
disarray, up to the point that Turkey considered the possibility o f intervening
Bilge Criss, “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963”, Journal o f  
Strategic Studies 20:2 (1997) p. 105.
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Soviet Note of May 30, 1953 in Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus. The Foreign Policy o f  
Turkey, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) p. 174.
G. Golan, Soviet Politics in the Middle Ea.st, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
p.257.
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militarily in Iraq but it was stopped short by the US and dissuaded by the maneuvers 
conducted by 24 Soviet divisions near the Turkish border. Contemporaneously, in 
Lebanon a civil war fomented by pro-Nasserite elements threatened a revolution, 
pushing Washington to dispatch its troops.
Subsequently, Turkey’s support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, its 
confrontational policy toward Syria in 1957 and Iraq in 1958, and its granting 
permission to the US to station troops at the NATO base in Adana during the crisis in 
Lebanon all caused Turkey’s credibility to sink even further in the eyes o f the Arabs, 
deepening its alienation in the region.
Hence, it is not surprising that Turkey, the “weak link” in Ben-Gurion’s 
strategy, became suddenly eager to improve its ties with Israel. From a Turkish 
perspective, the periphery pact symbolized the deep mistrust with which Ankara 
viewed the Arab world, while in terms of policy, the accord marked the high point o f 
political cooperation with Israel. As Nachmani argues, “In the 1958 agreement, the 
Turks appeared to have adopted the notion of ‘complementary nations’” . T h e  
cooperation between the two countries took place in a number of fields: Israel 
provided the know-how for the construction of an oil pipeline from Iran to Turkey, 
expertise in the development o f Turkish industry and agriculture, and military 
equipment for the Turkish armed forces; scientific cooperation in highly sensitive 
spheres was also developed mainly through secret meetings held in Geneva; and 
diplomatic through frequent consultations between the diplomats of the two countries 
accredited in various capitals and international organizations. In return, it was agreed 
that Israel would enjoy the support o f Turkey’s massive army.**’® Turkey also
Nachmani,/>yrae/, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean, p.75. 
Ibid.
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replaced Cyprus as Israel’s chief listening post for monitoring the Arab states. 
Moreover, an agreement on joint military action in the event that Aden, which lay on 
the route of the oil tankers, fell into Nasser’s hand was also concluded.*®^
2.3 An Alliance Unborn:
However, most of the 1958 agreements never fixlly materialized. The 
confluence of regional and international developments that acted as a catalyst for the 
alliance soon disappeared. Consequently, Turkey’s commercial relations with Israel 
went down to almost negligible levels and diplomatic relations were downgraded.
The overthrowing of the corrupt and repressive regime of Adnan Menderes 
by a military coup (May 27,1960) and the lessening of the Communist threat in the 
region, enabled Turkey to adopt a new policy towards the Middle East, characterized 
by greater autonomy in respect to its alignment with the West. Moreover, two events 
in the early 1960s -  the Cuban and the Cyprus crises -  precipitated a search for a 
foreign policy approach that would be less dependent on the US and NATO.
Turkish foreign policy makers perceived the manner in which the Cuban 
missile crisis was resolved as an example o f how a superpower, when the need arose, 
could overlook the concerns and interests o f a small ally. This sparked a debate in 
Turkey which seriously questioned the wisdom of a foreign policy that relied too 
much on the goodwill o f the US for ensuring Turkish security."” The second 
international event was constituted by Turkey’s experience during the Cyprus crisis 
of 1964, when Ankara realized that it was isolated in the international arena and, 
even worse, threatened by the US President Lyndon Johnson of being deprived from
109 Ibid.
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the protection o f NATO umbrella in the event of a Soviet intervention precipitated by 
a Turkish invasion o f the island. The Johnson letter rapidly eroded the credibility of 
the whole Western alliance in the eyes of the Turks, who realized that “rigid loyalty 
to the Western block was no guarantee o f securing the national interest” .'*’
The deterioration o f the Turkish relations with the West caused by the Cyprus 
dispute and, second, the improved commercial opportunities in the Arab countries 
convinced Ankara that a multifaceted foreign policy was needed; nevertheless, the 
foreign policy orientation remained unquestioned. In the Middle East, the newly 
“multi-faceted foreign policy” entailed a lessening of the cooperation with the US 
in the region, efforts to strengthen ties with the Arab states and a more balanced 
attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. Inevitably, Turkey’s policy to play a more 
constructive and independent role in the Middle East was accompanied by a steady
113reduction in its ties with Israel.
By adopting a policy o f “benevolent neutrality” toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Turkey was able, on the one side, to express its solidarity towards the Arab 
states and the Palestinians, and on the other side, to maintain its relations with 
Israel. The 1973 oil price hikes brought added pressure to expand commercial and 
political relations with the oil-rich Arab countries. The worsening economic
Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus. The Foreign Policy o f Turkey, p. 178-179. For a more 
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conditions o f the country"^ -  already badly affected by the dramatic increase in oil 
prices -  and the need for diplomatic support following the military operation in 
Cyprus in July 1974 pushed Turkey once more to increase its efforts aimed at 
improving its political and economic relations with the Arab states. Therefore, in the 
1970s, Turkey generally supported Arab resolutions at the UN General Assembly, 
including the 1975 resolution labeling Zionism as a form o f racism.
Israeli Knesset’s decision (1980) to enact the law declaring that “Jerusalem is 
united and it is the permanent capital o f Israel” was met by Turkey’s sharp reaction 
condemning the “Israeli annexation o f Jerusalem” . Demirel’s government, supported 
by a heterogeneous and weak coalition that included the Islamist National Salvation 
Party (MSP), soon came under intense domestic and Islamic pressure to break off its 
relations with Israel. By declaring, on 28 August 1980, the closure o f the Turkish 
general consulate in Jerusalem, the Turkish government adopted the minimum move 
necessary to alleviate domestic criticisms and maintain friendly relations with the 
Arab countries, a skilful action that did not cause significant harm to its relations 
with the US."*’
On December 2, 1980 the military regime that had taken power the previous 
September, seeking to gain internal and external Islamic credibility, formally 
downgraded the relations with Israel at the second secretary level. Turkey’s decision 
was adopted according to the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 
following reason: “Israel would not retreat from its intransigent policy toward the 
Middle East conflict and the fa it accompli that it wishes to create in connection with
Turkey’s economy was affected by the following; 1) oil price hikes; 2) continuous population 
growth (around 3% a year); 3) growing defense spending following the conflict in Cyprus and the US 
arms embargo; 4) ceasing of the migration of Turkish workers to Europe.
Despite the decision, the motion of censure against the Foreign Minister, Hayrettin Eikmen, 
introduced by the MSP was passed on 4 September 1980 and Erkmen was ousted from office.
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the legal status of Jerusalem” .**’ Despite this official explanation, it seems that the 
decision to downgrade relations with Israel was substantially determined by mere 
budgetary needs: in 1980, the total amount of Turkish exports was about $2,2 billion, 
while oil import expenditure by itself reached the figure of $2,6 billion,**^ Because of 
the severe economic crisis, and in order to obtain the necessary oil for the oncoming 
winter, the Turkish authorities were forced to seek the assistance of the Arab oil- 
producing countries. **^  According to George Gruen, a Saudi check o f  about $250 
million was delivered to Turkey on December 2, exactly the same day that Turkey 
announced the downgrading o f relations. *^ °
Turkey’s political and economic interests, rather than its ideological 
orientation, were o f paramount importance for the military regime. The new 
pragmatism was perhaps most clearly reflected in Turkey’s economic policy, which 
put a big emphasis on the development o f significant commercial ties with the Arab 
countries. Thanks to the new export promotion policies enacted by Turgut Ozal and 
to the higher purchasing power of the oil-rich countries, Turkey’s trade with the 
Middle Eastern countries in the first half o f the 1980s increased fivefold, from $630 
million (1980) to $3,188 million (1985).*^* The economic figures well elucidate also 
the correlation between Turkey’s economic expansion in the Middle East and the
The Middle East, February 1981, p.30.
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downgrading of economic and political relations with Israel, between 1980 and 1985, 
Turkey’s exports to Israel were characterized by a marked contraction that brought 
the bilateral trade to almost imperceptible levels.
However, the pro-Arab oscillation proved to be, once more, only temporary, 
tied to transitory international and regional circumstances, and never affected the 
basic pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s abstention from 
the UN voting on resolution ES9/1, which condemned Israel’s annexation o f the 
Golan, clearly showed that the pendulum was swinging back in favor o f Israel.
The decline o f the Middle Eastern markets in Turkey’s trade profile and the 
oil price falls o f the mid-1980s eroded significantly the economic and political 
leverage of the Arab states vis-à-vis Turkey. Because of the oil price collapse in 
1986, the value o f Turkish exports to Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia declined 
immediately by 48%, 42% and 17% respectively.'^^
Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Özal’s desire to improve Turkey’s 
relations with the US, and especially with the Congress, added other reasons to swing 
back to Israel. Özal openly relied on the sympathy o f the influential Jewish lobby to 
reach his aim. In an interview given to the newspaper Güneş (Sun), he declared that 
“If  the Arab countries ask for it [severing ties with Israel] we will always place 
emphasis on the cost-benefit issue. We know the role of the Israeli lobby in the 
US” ’23 'j'jygg years later Özal’s words were confirmed by events: in August 1987, 
thanks to the support of the Jewish lobby, the resolution aimed at declaring April 24
Halis Akder, “Turkey’s Export Expansion in the Middle East, 1980-1985”, Middle East Journal 
41:4(1987), p.555.
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as the “day of commemoration o f the Armenian genocide” was rejected by the House 
o f Representatives.
124 The same happened in February 1990 at the Senate.
41
CHAPTER III
TURKEY’S POST-COLD WAR DILEMMAS.
As Duygu Sezer asserts, “the end o f the Cold War and the Gulf crisis have 
brought Turkey’s grand strategy to an impasse” . The irreducible, paramount goal 
o f Turkey ever since its foundation as a modem state in 1923 has been the 
preservation o f its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Turkey’s post-World War II 
grand strategy had been almost fully based on NATO, which provided the security 
for the defense of Turkey’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, during 
most o f the Cold War period, Turkey’s alliance with the Western bloc guaranteed the 
economic and political support from the West which Ankara considered essential for 
its goal of becoming an equal, modem, and industrialized state within the Western 
world. The end of the East-West conflict and the consequent demise o f the Cold War 
raised fundamental questions about Turkey’s role in NATO and Turkey’s relations 
with the West.
3.1 Turkey and the West in the Post-Cold War Era: Ambivalent Allies:
Between 1989 and 1991 the global geopolitical mold broke. In November 
1989 the Berlin Wall fell, leading to the unification o f Germany the following year. 
In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the real end o f the Cold War was marked 
by Moscow’s support for US-sponsored UN resolutions against a former Soviet 
client. In December 1991 the Soviet Union itself was dissolved, and a new hybrid, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) appeared. The implications o f this
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revolution in world affairs for Turkish policymakers were dramatic, challenging and 
worrying.
The revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe and the transformation o f 
East-West security relations, in which the West no longer feared the East, meant that 
the military importance o f Turkey for the West as a key NATO front-line state 
bordering a hostile Soviet Union was undermined. Ankara received with mixed 
feelings the gradual improvement in the relations between the two blocs. The reasons 
for that ambivalence were both simple and convincing; Turkey, as a geostrategic 
rent-seeking c o u n t r y , w a s  worried that the West and especially its main ally, the 
US, would no longer be willing to extend its unconditional protection and political 
support and contribute financially to its security. Representative of Turkey’s anxiety 
toward the thaw in East-West relations was Sezer’s analysis in 1989: “It seems 
highly possible that at this juncture of Super Power accommodation, Turkey’s 
defense requirements would constitute only a marginal concern for Washington. The 
practical result of this situation is that Turkey must shoulder the costs o f being a 
member o f the NATO-US alliance alone while in the meantime assuming the risks 
alone in the furthest corner of the alliance” .
Moreover, the Cold War hid, but never cancelled, the political and social 
tensions and incompatibilities between Turkey and its Western partners. Turkey’s 
membership in Western institutions was mainly determined by the imperatives o f the 
fight against Communism rather than as recognition of the country’s “westernness”;
Duygu Sezer, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilenuna”, International Spectator 37:1 (1992) 
p.21. Sezer uses the term “grand strategy” to specify the security and non-security goals that a state 
should pursue, and to delineate how military power can serve those goals.
Generally, the term refers to those countries located in crucial geographical position that, imable to 
generate resources to develop their societies or defend them from external threat, by making security- 
based appeals to greater powers are able to obtain the political, economic and military support needed 
for their defense and development.
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in other words, the role of the Turks within NATO resembled the Latinized 
barbarians that garrisoned the provinces o f the Roman Empire against their similar 
located ultra limes. Following the end of the Cold War, these ambiguities and 
differences were accentuated by two main developments. 1) questions o f human 
rights and democracy were brought to the forefront of the Western agenda; and 2) the 
West was forced to give urgent priority to the task o f assisting the economic and 
political transition of the former Eastern European Communist countries. Turkey’s 
political leverage, already undermined by the reduced strategic importance o f the 
country, in any negotiations with the European Community was outpaced by these 
two developments.
Ankara’s relations with Western Europe entered a state of paralysis following 
the rejection o f the Turkish bid for membership in the EC in December 1989. 
Turkish exclusion from full participation in both the EC and the Western European 
Union (WEU) was understood in Ankara as a demonstration o f Europe’s 
unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security and political role on the old 
continent. Suspicions of Europe in Turkey were later raised further by other 
developments. First and foremost, the EU ’s decision, at the December 1997 summit 
in Luxembourg, to exclude Ankara from the list o f candidates from membership in 
the Union while it extended invitation to several formerly communist Eastern 
European countries and Greek-Cyprus. Kamran Inan, a former Turkish Ambassador 
and Minister o f State, argued that the possibility o f joining the EU in the future is 
diminishing because o f the developments in Eastern Europe, and suggests that
Duygu Sezer, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000”, in Turkish Political Science Association, 
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Europe gives priority to the Eastern European states rather than Turkey for cultural
reasons 128
The second factor is linked to the European reactions to human rights 
violations in Southeastern Anatolia, where the Turkish security forces have had to 
face a recrudescence o f PKK terrorism supported by Syria and Iran, increasingly 
aroused indignation in Turkey. As §adi Ergüvenç, a retired General, argues, “while 
Turkey expects its allies to give support that it deserves from them in its fight against 
the PKK terror, it receives an unwarranted embargo on associated weapons sales” .
Turkey’s fear of being marginalized by its Western partners were swept away 
by two developments -  namely, Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 -  that, temporarily, reversed 
the geostrategic balance in favor of Turkey.
Iraq's invasion o f Kuwait provided Ankara with a new trump card to 
reconfirm its strategic value to its Western allies. By supporting the US-led 
coalition against Baghdad, Turkey managed to transform itself into an indispensable 
partner in a particularly sensitive region, the Middle East and in particular in the Gulf
area.
However, while the events in the Gulf returned Turkey to the front rank in 
terms o f strategic attention, they did not yield tangible political, military, and 
economic benefits. The reassertion o f Turkey’s strategic importance after the Gulf 
War focused on the country’s role in Middle Eastern rather than European
Kamran Inan, Dış Politika (Istanbul:Ötüken, 1993), p.70.
Şadi Ergüvenç, “Turkey’s Security Perceptions”, Perceptions 2 (1998), p.40.
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Israeli scholar, Barry Rubin: Without the cooperation of Turkish President Ozal, the trade sanctions 
against Iraq would have been ineffective and the war effort far weaker. By letting AlUed air forces use 
Turkish bases to bomb West Iraq, Q/al has also made their defense o f Israel against Iraqi missiles far
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security.'^' This sparked a growing tension between Turkish political aspirations and 
traditional Western foreign policy orientation, and Western images of and interests in 
Turkey. Ankara’s essential role in the Gulf War reinforced the widespread European 
perception that Turkey is part of the Middle East, thus Turkey was, and still is, 
increasingly perceived by the European countries as a strategic liability because o f 
the additional burden imposed by its exposure in the Middle East. In response, 
Ankara felt it had to become more proactive in pursuing security policies in its 
Middle Eastern neighborhood and, at the same time, develop a “new strategic 
cooperation” with the President Ozal’s strategy o f close cooperation with the
Bush administration was primarily designed, as suggested by Sayari, “to reaffirm 
Ankara’s commitment to US-Turkish bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey’s 
importance to US strategic interests and concerns in the Middle East” .'^’
However, events following the end of the Gulf War did not evolve as Turkey 
hoped. Because of Washington’s inability to develop an effective policy for the 
Middle East in the post-Gulf war phase, the strategic cooperation between the US 
and Turkey never fully materialized.’ '^* The wartime consensus between the two 
allies over the policies to be pursued towards Saddam Hussein-led Iraq collapsed 
with the liberation of Kuwait, and was replaced by distinct goals concerning Iraq. In 
this regard, the repeated extensions by the Turkish Parliament o f operation “Provide
easier -  if still far from perfect” in “Turkey’s contribution to the war” Jerusalem Post, 24 January 
1991, p.5.
As Kuniholm put it, “ ...with the Soviet threat sharply diminished and Ankara having assumed an 
important role in the allied coalition against Iraq, Turkey’s strategic significance is once again 
assessed chiefly in its Middle Eastern context”, Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West”, Foreign 
70:2 (1991), p. 34.
See the interview with President Ôzal on the concept of “strategic cooperation” in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service-Western Einope Series, 2 April 1991, p. 32.
Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis”, Middle 
East Journal 46:1, (Winter 1992), p. 14.
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Comfort” -  renamed “Northern Watch” in December 1996 -  appear to be the result 
o f rational calculations by Turkish statesmen of the benefits for Turkey o f keeping 
this force on Turkish soil, despite the evident disadvantages that made Turkey 
become the biggest economic victim, after Iraq, of the Gulf War,*^^ Moreover, 
Ankara fears that the US efforts to topple Saddam Hussein may further destabilize 
the region and open the way for the creation o f an independent Kurdish state in 
Northern Iraq, an event that would pose a dangerous precedent for the Kurds in 
Turkey. This sense of distrust toward the Clinton administration’s initiatives in Iraq 
has been manifestly expressed by Bülent Ecevit, then Turkish Prime Minister, who 
said that the US intends to violate Iraq’s territorial integrity by establishing a Kurdish 
state in the north, a Shiite state in the south and a weak Arab state in the central part 
of Iraq.'
While relations between Turkey and its Western allies were reaching a critical 
point in 1991, the collapse o f the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly 
independent Turkic states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia provided Turkish 
officials with new opportunities and challenges.
Although the disappearance of the Soviet threat radically improved the 
security of the country, Ankara did not alter its pro-Western policy, rather it hoped 
and believed that an active role in the post-Soviet Turkic Republics would have 
boosted Turkey’s international image, enhanced the prospects of its admission to the 
EU and improved the Turkish-US relations. In his speech at the opening of the
The former American Ambassador to Tuikey, Morton Abramowitz, argues that “Bush chose not to 
take up the offer of ‘strategic cooperation’”, in idem, “Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal”, foreign 
Policy 9\ (1993), p. 179.
As Aykan put it, “the departure of the force would, however, deprive Turkey o f an important 
bargaining chip in contacts made with both the North Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the Western states 
with a view to discouraging the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq” in
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Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in September 1994, President Demirel 
likened Turkey to an opened gate through which Europe and the US could enter and 
develop relations with the Turkic states.'^^
Turkey’s euphoria*^^ was further strengthened by Washington’s endorsement 
in the early 1990s o f Turkey’s secularism, democracy and market-oriented economy 
as a model o f development for the former Soviet Muslim republics; a strategy based 
largely on the fear that Islamic fundamentalism, supported by Iran, would make
139major inroads into Central Asia.
Yet, despite the inflated US public rhetoric promoting the “Turkish model”, 
Washington’s political and financial support never materialized. Rather, the US by 
pursuing its “Russian-first” policy sanctioned Moscow’s “Near Abroad” doctrine and 
Russian request to relax the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty restrictions 
on the “flanks” (i.e. the Caucasus). In both issues Ankara felt it was being ignored 
and sidelined about decisions that affected its immediate interests. As suggested by 
Nicole and Hugh Pope, “Turkey was being manipulated. When the international 
configuration changed in 1993, talk o f a ‘Turkish model’ disappeared from the 
geopolitical scene as fast as it had arrived”. A s  a result, the earlier -  largely 
unrealistic and exaggerated -  expectations have been gradually replaced by more 
sober and less ambitious analysis o f Turkey’s potential regional role and policy 
objectives.
Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95”, Middle Eastern Studies 32:4 
(October 1996), p. 356.
Ilnur Çevik, “Iraq remains a source of concern for Turkey”, Turkish Probe, 10 January 1999, p. 10.
' Turkish Daily News, 2 September 1994.
President Özal declared that “the 2F ‘ century will be the century of the Turks”; the PM Demirel 
stated that “With the collapse of Communism, a new Turkish world is opening up, which stretches 
from the Adriatic Sea in the West to the Great Wall of China in the East”.
Washington Post, “US, Turkey pledge aid to new states”, 12 February 1992.
Hugh Pope and Nicole Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After (London: J. Murray, 1997) p.290.
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The US remains the most important Turkish bilateral relationship, but new 
irritations compound traditional ambivalence. In particular, the different Turkish and 
US approaches to the Kurdish issue have the potential to undermine the Turkish-US 
alliance in the post-Cold War era. As Aykan argues, “these differences stem from 
incompatibilities in the political and cultural traditions o f Turkey and the US that 
have come to the forefront with the disappearance of the Soviet threat” .''*' The US 
Administration finds it more and more difficult to defend indefinitely Ankara before 
members of Congress who are worried about the growing dimensions o f the Kurdish 
conflict and its potential threat to the stability o f the region -  leaving aside its 
implications for human rights. Indeed, strains on the Turkish-US relationship are 
caused, from time to time, by Congress’s linking economic and military assistance to 
the improvement of Turkey’s human rights record, a conditionality bluntly rejected 
by Turkey.''*^ Though many Turkish decision-makers increasingly acknowledge that 
Turkey has human rights problems, they find US policy in this area irreconcilable 
with the longstanding alliance relationship between the two countries. Ankara has 
also found the US an increasingly less reliable source of arms: in 1996, pro-human 
rights groups together with the pro-Greek and the pro-Armenian lobbies in Congress 
were able to block the shipment o f ten Super Cobra helicopters and freeze for more 
that a year the transfer of three frigates to Turkey.''*^ As the Director of the Foreign 
Policy Institute in Ankara, Seyfi Ta§han, stresses, “the anti-Turkish lobbies in the US 
are capable, from time to time, to cause major setback in Turkish-US strategic
A ykan,, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 1989-95”, Middle East Journal 50:3 (1996), p.349.
Carol Migdalowitz, “Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues”, CRS Issue Brief 
(Congressional Research Service, The Library o f Congress), 1 May 1998; and the editorial “Arms Aid 
to Turkey?”, in the International Herald Tribune, 17 October 1995.
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cooperation” /'*'* Clearly, one disadvantage Turkey has in this regard is the absence of 
an effective lobby able to influence the Congress.
Finally, the uneasiness that underlies the relations between Ankara and 
Washington is also partially linked to the steady decrease in levels of US security 
and economic assistance, which was ended completely in the 1999 fiscal year 
budget.
In short, the US has shown little interest in the post-Cold War era in building 
Turkey into a strong regional power capable o f enforcing common bilateral interests. 
According to Makovsky, this reflects “constraints on US resources; domestic 
political considerations, particularly with regard to US supporters o f Gheece and 
Armenia; skepticism regarding Turkey’s regional image, which is still colored by 
age-old rivalries and imperial past; concerns about Turkey’s human rights 
shortcomings; and a certain wariness among some officials as to whether a strong 
Turkey able to act as an independent regional force would necessarily behave in 
ways to enhance US interests” .*'*^
Thanks to its crucial geopolitical position, Turkey is, and will remain, 
important to US policy initiatives in the region; nevertheless, unprecedented 
challenges originating from the domestic politics o f both countries and their different 
regional approaches to regional challenges may easily cause a deterioration in the 
Turkish-US relationship. On the other side, a state o f malaise characterized by 
frustration at unrealized ambitions and an overall feeling o f marginalization, coupled 
with a somewhat excessive nationalism, has become a quasi-permanent feature of
Metehan Demir “At last, Turkey is able to take delivery o f controversial frigates from US”, Turkish 
Daily News, 8 November 1997, p. 1-2 and Uguz Akinci “Turkey hits US for double standard in arms 
sales”, Turkish Daily News, 10 December 1997, p. 3.
Interview, 10 April 1999, Ankara.
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Turkey’s relations with Europe; a broad range of grievances vis-à-vis Europe that has 
led to a virtual paralysis in the relations between Ankara and the EU. Turkey’s deep 
dissatisfaction with the ambivalence show by its Western European allies is well 
outlined by General Çevik Bir, who noted that “the same West which once described 
Turkey as a ‘staunch ally’ and a ‘bastion’ is now following a policy o f excluding 
Turkey from the map of Europe” . The Turkish General continues by stressing that 
“today Europe is, on the one hand, keeping Turkey outside the EU, while on the 
other, adopting an attitude that almost ignores and even complicates Turkey’s 
legitimate security requirements
Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SALS Review 19:1 
(Winter/Spring 1999), p.l09.
'''* Çevik Bir, “Turkey’s Role in the New World Order. New Challenges”, Strategic Lorum, no. 135 
(1998), p. 4.
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CHAPTER IV
AN ISRAELI SOLUTION FOR TURKEY’S DILEMMAS?
On November 13, 1993, exactly two months after the handshake by Yitzak 
Rabin and Yasser Arafat at the White House, Hikmet Çetin became the first-ever 
Turkish Foreign Minister to visit Israel. Since then, Turkish-Israeli relations have 
developed in an unprecedented way -  the extraordinary flurry o f high-level visits 
between the two countries over the past six years has resulted in various agreements 
embracing virtually all sectors.
Against an overall background characterized by Turkey’s growing 
involvement in the affairs of the Middle East -  where its future political and 
economic role is ambiguous and not easily definable -  at a time when its status with 
its Western allies is on the decline, Ankara has seen in Israel a potential ally that may 
help to overcome both challenges. In this perspective, Israel constitutes a regional, as 
well as Western, solution to Ankara’s Middle Eastern problems, and, at the same 
time, the best ally to improve its relations with the US.
4.1 Factors Shaping Turkey’s Israeli Initiative:
Despite its strategic location, Turkey’s primary economic and political 
relationship has been historically with Western Europe and the US. This was a 
comfortable -  even if  not always satisfactory -  relationship that provided Turkey 
with security and access to markets in the West as well as to economic aid. But the 
chain o f events unleashed by the end o f the Cold War badly affected Turkey’s 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the US and thé West more generally.
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Turkey responded to this challenge by introducing foreign policies that are 
considerably more activist and assertive compared to the past and by stressing in a 
more active manner the regional character of its foreign policy. However, it should 
be stressed that these developments did not lead to any change in Ankara’s foreign 
policy orientation: Turkey’s foreign policy priorities are still firmly focused on its 
relations with the Western powers. For most Turkish foreign policymakers, the 
principle enunciated by Atatürk in 1923 is still a dominant theme; “The West has 
always been prejudiced against the Turks... but we Turks have always and 
consistently moved towards the West. . . In order to be a civilized nation, there is no 
alternative” . I n  short, Turkish foreign policy changed in term o f style, by 
becoming more activist and assertive, but it did not deviate from its long-held 
Western focus.
Ankara’s new activism in the international arena is nowhere more evident 
today than in its opening of a bold diplomatic, economic and military relationship 
with Israel. Contrary to what is commonly perceived in the Arab world, the impetus 
for the military alignment between the two countries did not come from Israel, but 
from the Turkish side and more precisely from the Turkish Armed Forces. While in 
the late 1950s it was Israel looking at Turkey as a suitable partner for its “peripheral 
pact” strategy, in the early 1990s the initiative was largely undertaken by Ankara’s 
powerful generals. As Henri Barkey suggests, “the old courtship game has been
M7 See Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle East Journal 52:1 
(1998), pp.32-50.
Quoted in Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World, p.49.
As Aykan suggests, “Turkish forei^  policy during the Kuwait crisis was not, in fact a deviation 
from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy o f maintaining a balance between the requirements of 
Turkey’s membership in the Western Alliance and those of preserving friendly relations with its 
neighbors”. Mahmut Aykan, ‘Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95”, Middle Eastern Studies
32:4(1996), p.344.
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reversed” . Several factors resulting from Turkey’s domestic, regional and 
international environment combined to encourage Ankara to boost its relations with 
Israel. These factors included: a distinct sense o f self-confidence, the Arab-Israeli 
peace process; the strained relations between Turkey and most of the Arab countries; 
increasing lack of confidence on NATO’s security guarantees, and the new security 
and political challenges emerging in the Middle East.
The first reason is the general sense of self-confidence prevailing among the 
Turkish élites. Despite persistent fiscal problems such as inflation and budget 
deficits, the structural changes of the last two decades allowed the Turkish economy 
to grow at breathtaking rates throughout most of the 1980s (average growth rate 
nearly 8%) and early 1990s (average growth rate nearly 5%). As a result, by 1991 the 
per capita gross national product (GNP) had doubled from $1.300 to $2.600, foreign 
trade as a percentage o f Turkey’s Gross National Product increased from 9 per cent 
(1979) to 26 per cent (1993) and foreign direct investments stood at the end of 1995 
at $2.9 billion, a figure far superior to the $97 million registered sixteen years earlier. 
This robust economic performance provides the Turks with a sense o f 
accomplishment and self-confidence about the long-term economic perspective of 
the country. During the last decade, Ankara has also significantly improved its 
military capabilities. Between 1985 and 1995, Turkey’s defense expenditures more 
than doubled, from $3.1 billion to $6.8 b i l l i o n . T h a n k s  to the increased 
expenditure and to the “cascade program” that resulted from the 1990 CFE treaty.
150 Henri Barkey, “Turkey and the New Middle East” in Henri Barkey, ed., Reluctant Neighbor. 
Turkey's Role in ¡he Middle East (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 
38.
IISS, The Military Balance 1997/98, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
A process the resulted from the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) limiting the 
military equipment that states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact are allowed to mantain. As
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Turkey has now a modern conventional force, whose building blocks are 180 F-16 
and 140 F-4 combat aircraft and 3 KC-135R aircraft tankers, 1100 M-60 and 325 
Leopard tanks, 49 S-70 Blackhawk helicopters, and a naval fleet which has been 
significantly modernized and expanded. Furthermore, its ground forces and pilots 
have gained valuable combat experience fighting the PKK separatists in 
Southeastern of Anatolia and northern Iraq; in May 1997, at one stage, up to 50,000 
Turkish troops were deployed in Northern Iraq carrying out a major offensive against 
the guerrillas
Turkey’s higher profile in the neighboring regions is further spurred by the 
growing sense that the military gap between itself and its traditional rivals is steadily 
growing in its favor, Turks still love to bemoan their bad neighborhood,*^^ but their 
neighbors have suffered serious setbacks in military strength in recent years. Most 
important, the Russians are no longer even neighbors; the common borders are gone, 
a development that swept away more than three hundred years of fear. The Russian 
threat is to a great extent diminished, if not ended. The poor performance of 
Moscow’s forces in Chechnya has strongly reassured the Turks. Moreover, thanks to 
the mitigating security concerns, Moscow and Ankara are close economic partners, a 
key factor that explains Russia’s decision not to grant political asylum to the PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Without its Soviet protector, debt-ridden Syria has been unable to renew 
significantly its military inventory in the last decade. A significant portion of the 
Syrian weapon arsenal is out of commission since Soviet military aid came to an end
aresult of the CFE, Turkey received the excess top-of-the-line equipment formerly owned by the US 
and some European countries, who were cutting down their arsenals to meet the CFE- required limits.
The former Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin, for example, stated in 1993, that “because its 
geopolitical location places Turkey in the neighborhood o f the most unstable, uncertain and
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and the supply o f spare parts has stopped. As Şükrü Elekdağ suggests, “Turkey has a 
clear superiority over Syria as regards a comparison o f the two countries’ armed 
forces” .’ '^* Iraq’s military machine has been heavily damaged in two wars and by the 
subsequent US-British bombings, and the very future of the state is uncertain. 
Compared with Iraq and Syria, Iran’s challenge to Turkey’s national security 
interests is more subtle and varied. Iran may aspire to primacy in the Persian Gulf, 
but, it is far from posing a military threat to Turkey. The main source o f tension 
between the two countries regards Teheran’s relentless support for Islamic 
fundamentalist movements in Turkey. More recently, the practices of co-optation and 
direct military intervention in Northern Iraq by Turkey and Iran not only exacerbated 
intra-Kurdish discord, but also contributed to Turkish-Iranian f r i c t i o n . I n  short, 
“Turkey considers the nature of the Iranian threat to be more political than 
military” .'^ *’
However, it is clear that Turkey’s neighborhood is not trouble-free. From a 
short-term perspective it is the proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction (WMD) 
and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) that poses potential military risks to Turkish 
security. Turkey has no known national WMD capability, no anti-missile capability 
and no offensive missile capability. In contrast, Iran, Syria and Iraq all have WMD 
programs. Iran, in particular, is widely believed to be pursuing a nuclear program. 
Yet, the sense o f alarm and urgency about the possibility o f proliferation is not 
overwhelming- at least not yet. Thus, it is not surprising that in his analysis
unpredictable region of the world, it has turned into a frontline state faced with multiple fronts”. 
Quoted by Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, p.33.
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 'A War Strategy”, Perceptions 1:1 (1996), p.51.
' ”  See Michael Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan”, Middle East Quarterly 5:1(1998), 
pp.3340,
Mahmut Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security 
in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989-95”, Middle East Journal 50:3 (1996), p.353
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“Turkey’s security perceptions”. General (Rtd.) Erguveii9 does not indicate the 
proliferation o f WMDs as a major threat for Turkey, rather, he asserts that “Turkey’s 
military capabilities are presently superior to those o f most o f its neighbors” . T h e  
same conclusion is re-stated by Seyfi Ta§han, who argues that “Turkey is the 
strongest military and economic power in the Middle East” .*^ *
The second factor is related to the Arab-Israeli peace process. In particular, 
Ankara realized that it had nothing to gain from a deal between Israel and Syria 
through the Middle East peace process. Peace with Israel could free some Arab 
countries, notably Syria, to pursue long-standing grievances against Turkey. Turkey 
had been closely observing with worry the Israeli-Syrian peace talks. First, Ankara 
was concerned that a possible redeployment o f Syrian troops from the Golan Heights 
might result in a Syrian military build up along the Turkish border, which would 
have altered in Syria’s favor the military balance in Turkey’s Southeast. In 1996, 
Elekdag rang the alarm bell in Ankara by saying that “When peace is struck between 
Syria and Israel, Damascus can be expected to pursue her objectives concerning 
Syrian demands over Hatay and the waters o f the Euphrates much more actively” . 
Second, the Turks feared that after an agreement between Israel and Syria, there 
might have been a concerted pressure on Turkey, this time possibly involving Israel 
and the Western countries, to make agreements with its neighbors on the water issue. 
Specifically, at the beginning o f 1996 when the peace negotiations were moving 
towards an agreement, the US put forward a proposal to ask Turkey to compensate 
Syria for water from the Golan that Damascus had to give to Israel in order to
§adi Ergiivenc, “Turkey’s Security Perceptions”, p.36.
Seyfi Ta§han, “A Review of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Beginning of 1998” Foreign Policy
(Ankara) 22:1-3 (1998), p.22
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 'A War Strategy”, p.52.
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facilitate the peace agreements. The request was forthrightly rejected by Ankara. 
According to an Israeli scholar, Ankara was also perturbed by “the possibility o f  
Israel lobbying for Syria’s removal from the US list o f states that support terrorism 
or trade in drugs’’.* ’^ Finally, the establishment o f full peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors would almost inevitably make irrelevant the so-called peripheral 
strategy: Turkey would not have the same importance for Israel. The timing o f 
Turkey’s offer to Israel of a comprehensive military agreement and the following 
leak o f most details to the press exactly when the peace-negotiations reached a 
critical stage are a further indications that Ankara’s aims in concluding the alliance 
with Israel were far-reaching: the prevention o f an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty and the 
isolation o f Damascus.
The third factor is linked to the poor state o f Ankara’s relations with the Arab 
world. By the early 1990s, it became clear that Turkey had derived neither the 
economic nor the diplomatic benefit it had hoped from its ties with the Islamic world. 
As mentioned in the study “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives” published by the 
Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute (DPE), “religious rapprochement with the 
Middle Eastern states and the Turkish support o f the Arab cause did not necessarily 
obtain the desired results as far as Turkish foreign policy was concerned”. This 
consideration leads to the conclusion that “this reluctance to support Turkey by the 
Middle Eastern countries is against the Turkish national interests” . T h e  
disaffection with a pro-Arab policy that failed to pay anticipated diplomatic
Alain Greish, “Turkish-Israeli Relations and their Impact on the Middle East”, Middle East Journal 
52:2 (1998), p .l98. Turkey’s unwillingness to supply water to the Syrians in order to facilitate the 
conclusion of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria has been recently re-stated to the author by 
Tiirkekul Kurttekin, Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs at the Tuikish ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs. Interview, 7 April 1999, Ankara.
Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie”, Middle East Quarterly 5:2 (1998),
p.20.
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dividends is well expressed by Semih İdiz, a Turkish journalist: “Looking at recent 
history one sees nothing but negative examples ranging from nonexistent ‘Islamo- 
Arab solidarity’ for the Turkish cause in Cyprus, to Arab countries actually claiming 
chunks o f Turkey, as Syria does, to the dangerous meddling in Turkey’s internal 
affairs, again as Syria does, through support for a group that every civilized nation 
sees as a terrorist organization” . Consequently, there is a deep resentment, both at 
the governmental level and among the public, about the lack o f understanding and 
support shown by the Arab world vis-à-vis Turkey’s security issues in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.*^'* Based on this, Turkish foreign policy-makers have concluded that 
religious brotherhood with the Arab world cannot be a crucial criterion for 
developing policies related to the national security o f Turkey whenever an Arab 
nation or its interests are involved. Moreover, the Islamic Middle East has declined 
in economic importance to Ankara, once consuming some 45 per cent o f the Turkish 
export in the mid-1980s, it now buys just around 12 per cent. Meanwhile, growing 
disagreements over the water issue have badly affected Ankara’s relations with the 
Arab countries since 1990. Finally, the Gulf War and its aftermath highlighted the 
fragmentation o f the Arab world -  with Egypt and Syria supporting the US-led allied 
coalition against Saddam Hussein and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cutting off financial 
aid to the PLO because o f its pro-Iraqi stance -  and led the Turkish policymakers to 
conclude that Ankara did not need to worry about retaliation from the oil-rich Arab 
states if it chose to improve its relations with Israel.
“Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives” Foreign Policy (Ankara) 17: 9 (1993).
Semih Idiz, “So what does Turkey owe the Arabs?”, Turkish Probe, 14 June 1996, p.3.
Historically, an earlier negative evaluation o f the idea o f an “Arab/Muslim bloc” by the Turks was 
provoked by the lack o f support showed by the Muslim states during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. This 
view was further reinforced by the tack o f Muslim solidarity during the forced migration of the 
Turkish minority (in less than 3 months, 320.000 people crossed the border with Tuikey) from 
Bulgaria in June 1989.
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Turkey’s lack of confidence on the full support o f NATO in the protection o f 
Ankara’s interests in the Middle East and Turkey’s uneasiness toward the 
enlargement o f the Atlantic Alliance and the emerging security architecture in 
Europe gave Turkey additional reasons to look for alternatives to safeguard its 
national interests in its Middle Eastern neighborhood. The Gulf War confirmed what 
the Turks had long suspected: in the post-Cold War, aggression against Turkey by 
one o f its Arab neighbors would not be considered by some NATO members as an 
aggression against all NATO members. The debate that took place, during the Gulf 
War, within each European country about the necessity, wisdom and merits o f 
getting involved in protecting Turkey left the Turks with a bitter taste; the Western 
partners showed that they were far from being reliable allies. Turkey realized that 
it could not count on NATO support against Middle Eastern threats*^^
As Elekdag argues, “With the dissolution o f the Soviet Union, NATO has 
totally lost its function o f providing support for Turkey’s defense” . T h e  “Central 
European oriented” approach implicit in NATO’s enlargement to some former 
Warsaw Pact members creates further suspicions, from a Turkish perspective, that 
the Alliance’s primary strategic goal has become the enhancement of security in 
Central Europe. Taking into account that the new NATO members from Central 
Europe are going to become soon full members o f the EU and, therefore o f the WEU, 
Turkey may find itself providing security as a NATO member and as an associate o f 
the WEU to the EU countries without benefiting from whatever security guarantee
As Sczer argues, “It was obvious that NATO’s European allies would have been reluctant to 
invoke Article 5 o f the NATO Treaty if Turkey had actually become a target o f an Iraqi attack”, 
Duygu Sezer,, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma”, p.29.
>66 NATO deployed an allied mobile force in Turkey more than a month after Ankara's official 
request, moreover, most of the 40 planes sent were obsolescent F-104s and Alpha-Jets. The move 
triggered off complaints in Germany, where there was strong opposition to any military involvement
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that the WEU arrangements would provide to its EU-members. In short, Turkey may 
find itself being a contributor to European security without being entitled to take part 
in the actual decision-making process. It appears that, as Taçhan indicates, “the 
lessening o f West European concern in Turkey’s security interests and the lack o f 
disposition to avail itself o f Turkey’s strategic assets, Turkey needs to establish new 
strategic balances in its region in an effort to reduce its defense burden, although, 
such an effort involve a certain degree o f decoupling between Turkey’s and West 
European security perceptions and interests” . Besides the shortcomings o f the new 
European security architecture, the various arms embargos imposed by the and 
by some European countries to Turkey in the last few years pushed Ankara to look 
for some other reliable suppliers and “to become more self-sufficient in meeting its 
own military requirements” .’^^
Finally, Ankara’s increasing involvement in the affairs o f the Middle East has 
constituted a further reason to look for a reliable ally in the region. Since the end o f 
the Cold War, the most pressing political and security challenges that Turkey has 
been facing have a Middle Eastern connotation: the Kurdish problem, the future o f 
Iraq and the water question. Kurdish nationalism constitutes the most important 
threat to Turkey’s national security, that is, to its territorial integrity and national 
unity. While noting that the Kurdish issue remains one o f the most urgent and 
complicated domestic problems facing Turkey,’’ ’ it is more important, from the
in the Middle East. This in turn provoked some sharp attacks by Turkish President Özal on the 
Germans as unreliable allies, see The Guardian (25 January 1991).
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 '/2  War Strategy”, p.54.
Seyfi Taşhan, A Review o f Turkish Foreign Policy in the Beginning o f 1998” p.5.
Barlaz Özener, Turkey’s ambassador to Israel, observed that Ankara sought to purchase more 
weapons and arms from Israel because the US was an “unreliable partner”. Cumhuriyet, 25 February 
1997.
'™ Ergüvcnç, “Turkey’s Security Perceptions”, p .41.
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perspective o f this study, to stress the transnational character that the Kurdish 
question has assumed recently. Post-Gulf War developments have vastly complicated 
Turkey’s Kurdish problem. The crisis o f late March 1991, when more than 1.5 
million Iraqi Kurds fled towards Iran and Turkey in order to escape from the Iraqi 
military operations against them, had three important effects on Turkey.
First, in Northern Iraq the creation o f a safe heaven under the protection o f 
the allied forces increased the ability o f the PKK to launch operations against 
Turkey. The creation o f a de-facto Kurdish controlled zone above the Sb“' parallel 
has greatly worried Ankara, which perceives the Kurdish enclave as a possible future 
model for its own Kurdish minority and as part o f a broader Western scheme to 
weaken Turkey. This is probably best captured by a retired Turkish colonel who 
remarked: “The United States, under the pretext o f protecting human rights, is 
assisting the formation o f a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq which eventually will 
demand land from Turkey” .
Second, there had been, in several instances, signs that Saddam Hussein had 
armed and supplied the PKK in apparent retaliation for Turkey’s close cooperation 
with allied forces during the war.'^^ Baghdad joined Damascus and Teheran in 
supporting and encouraging the PKK to carry out attacks on Turkey: the Kurdish 
problem remains a tool o f power politics that Turkey’s neighbors actively exploit 
against it. PKK attacks originating from Iran have frequently brought tensions 
between the two countries: in May 1995 the Turkish press reported that Ankara was 
considering a military attack on PKK basis in Iran. Since the early 1980s the Syrian 
government has provided shelter to the PKK, supplied it with weapons, trained PKK
Quoted by Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the US: Ambivalent Allies” in Валу Rubin and Thomas 
Keaney, eds., Friends o f America: US Allies in a Changing World, (London. Frank Cass, in press).
’ New York Times, “Iraqis arc arming the rebel Kurds in Turkey’s south”, 20 October 1991.
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militants and used them against Turkey, Concern over Syria’s backing the PKK and 
its close relations with Greece led Şükrü Elekdağ to argue that Turkey should base its 
national defense strategy on the ability to fight contemporaneously two and a half 
wars: against Syria, Greece and the PKK.’ '^' In conclusion, as Barkey put it, “The 
fact that the PKK has managed to obtain support from Syria, Iran and Saddam 
Hussein to mount multifaceted political and military operations demonstrates that 
resolving the internal conflict will require an internal strategy as well as an external
one .175
Third, the attention o f the world was drawn to the Kurds and attention to 
Turkey’s own Kurdish problem was accentuated. It was at the time o f the 1991 
refugees crisis that the problem came to the fore to such an extent that it led the 
government to recognize a “Kurdish reality” in Turkey, Turkey realized that it is, in a 
way, a hostage o f the Kurdish conflict; its ability to maneuver on the international 
scene, especially in the West, is severely curtailed by the internationalization o f the 
Kurdish issue, Turkey’s failure to resolve the Kurdish problem accompanied by the 
problem o f human rights violations and democratization have cast a long shadow on 
Ankara’s relations with its Western allies, US assistant secretary o f state Richard 
Holbrooke reportedly warned that “persistent problems” concerning the human rights 
situation in Turkey might “deter trade” with Ankara following “legislative pressure” 
in the However, much more problematic for Ankara is the “politicization o f
arms sales” , Turkey is heavily dependent on US military equipment -  80 per cent o f 
its military arsenal is US made -  but it has found Washington an increasingly less 
reliable source of weapons in recent times. Protecting and promoting the Turkish
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 '/2  War Strategy”, p,56,
Henri Barkey, “Turkey and the New Middle East” p,33,
176 FBIS-WES, 10 February 1995, p,41.
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political, military, economic interests in the Congress has become a dire imperative 
for Ankara due to the increasing capacity o f  human rights groups together with anti- 
Turkish lobbies to affect negatively the US legislation regarding Turkey.
4.2 Turkey’s Goals:
Ankara envisions potentially wide-ranging benefits from close ties with 
Israel. The most important, from the Turkish perspective, is enhancing Turkey’s 
influence in the West -  most notably in the US. Turkish foreign policy-makers 
increasingly perceive Western foreign policy priorities as running counter to 
Turkey’s interests, especially regarding Ankara’s security priorities in the Middle 
East. Whereas Western, and especially American, vital interests in the region 
surrounding Turkey have diminished somewhat with the end o f the Cold War, 
Turkey’s own interests have grown and expanded across a much broader region and 
have become more vital.
The conflictual attitude that characterizes Turkey’s relations with its Western 
allies is reflected in Hasan Kdni’s conclusion that “Western European and US 
policies have given rise to the isolation o f Turkey on the international scene”. T h i s  
sense o f isolation has been significantly fuelled by several developments. First, 
Ankara’s relations with its Western allies have been showing increasing signs o f 
strain. In particular, relations between Turkey and the EU have gone badly wrong in 
the last decade, up to the point that Ankara decided, following the EU ’s infamous 
sidelining o f Turkey’s application for full membership in December 1997, to suspend 
all political relations (but not the customs union) with Brussels. While the
Quoted from Henri Barkcy and Graham Fuller,Ti/rAcy’5  Kurdish Question, (New York; Rowman 
1998), p. 163.
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explanation for Turkey’s application rejection was fundamentally based on economic 
criteria, this was widely perceived in Ankara as an excuse to exclude Turkey because 
it is a Muslim country. This perception was reinforced by the European incapability 
or insensitiveness to stop timely the slaughter o f Muslims in Bosnia and then in 
Kosovo and by incautious statements by European politicians. The European 
criticisms to Turkey’s human rights practices, especially in relation to the Kurdish 
issue, and the weapons embargo declared, from time to time, against Turkey by 
several European countries (for example, Germany, Norway, Denmark and Holland) 
have further aggravated relations. The sum result is a widespread impression in 
Turkey that Europe is at best unsympathetic and unreliable, and at worst racist and a
178promoter of terrorism in Turkey.
If the European pillar o f Turkey’s foreign relations was increasingly showing 
cracks, relations with the US, the other pillar, showed growing strains. While it is 
clear that the US is o f all the Western countries the most sympathetic to Turkey’s 
interests, it is also evident that domestic politics, and not only American strategic 
considerations, have an increasing influence on W ashington’s foreign policy. This is 
intimately linked to the demise o f the Soviet threat and to the growing assertiveness 
o f human rights groups and NGOs within the US Congress. This development has 
further worsened Turkey’s standing vis-à-vis the Congress, in which Turkey has 
historically met the joint opposition o f the powerful Armenian- and Greek-American 
lobbies and suffered for the absence o f  an effective pro-Turkish lobby.
In light o f repeated Congressional criticism and efforts to limit aid levels 
based on Turkey’s human rights record, the recurrent attempts to pass legislation
The Turkish Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, in an interview to the Turkish Daily News 
has openly stated that “Europe is promoting separatism in Turicey and accused Eitfope of being
65
commemorating the “Armenian genocide”, and, most seriously, the setbacks suffered 
in procuring US weapons, Ankara duly realized that if historically not alienating the 
pro-Israeli lobby was a factor in some decisions, recently gaining its support to 
balance the strength o f the anti-Turkish lobbies drastically increased in importance. 
Already in 1994, Şükrü Elekdag -  who is very familiar with the dynamics o f US 
domestic politics thanks to his nine-year (1980-89) tenure as Turkish Ambassador to 
Washington -  argued that “The Israel lobby in the US is far superior to all other 
ethnic lobbies put together. Whenever this lobby has worked for us [the Turks], 
Turkey’s interests have been perfectly protected against the fools in the US. The 
development o f relations between Turkey and Israel and the formalization o f their 
de-facto alliance will place this lobby permanently on our side” .^ ^^  Ankara deeply 
believes that its alignment with Israel would ease its way to the US legislature and 
“conquer” Congress on its b ehalf’*® As Kemal Kirişçi put it, “Jewish lobby groups 
are seen by many Turkish officials and commentators as another means with which 
to counter anti-Turkish influence in the Congress. In these circles there is a belief 
that this would be a natural outcome o f  enhanced Israel-Turkish relations” .’*' This 
perception is further strengthened in the Turkish opinion by positive past 
experiences: in the 1980s the Israeli lobby played a key role in setting aside April 24 
as a day o f “commemoration for the victims o f the Armenian genocide” whenever it 
emerged in Congress’ agenda.’*^  Ankara’s reliance on the American Jewish lobby to 
promote Turkey’s interests and image in the US does not seem to trouble Israel;
responsible for the atrocities suffered by the Bosnian Muslims during the war in Yugoslavia”, Turkish 
Daily News, 23 January 1998.
Milliyet, 14 December 1994.
Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership”, paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson 
Center, Washington DC, 16 Septmber 1998.
Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the US: Ambivalent Allies”.
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rather Israeli officials have openly acknowledged that they fiilly understand and 
support Ankara’s goal to strengthen its ties with the US. Israeli Defense Minister 
Yitzhak Mordechai confirmed that Israel is assisting Turkey on the American 
political scene and encouraging Jewish organizations to follow this example.'*^ Zvi 
Bar’el, one o f the leading editorialists o f the Israeli newspaper Ha-aretz, wrote that 
“The strategic alliance [Turkey] really wants, then, is not with a regional power, even 
if  its name is Israel, but with the US”.**“’ Perversely, as Zvi Elpeleg, Israel’s former 
Ambassador in Ankara, notes, it is helpful that Turks believe in the Protocols o f the 
Elders o f Zion and other conspiratorial anti-Semitism, for this leads them to think
185that Israel has vast powers.
In conclusion, Ankara sees its alliance with Israel as part o f a triangular 
relationship with the US that may well compensate for Turkey’s weakening ties with 
the EU. While it is at best uncertain whether friendship with Israel may translate into 
support in the Congress, it is certain that Turkey’s cooperation with Israel has 
fundamentally a Western rather than a Middle Eastern “target”.
Because both Israel and Turkey’s military inventories are based on US 
equipment, Turkey also sees Israel as an alternative and at times cheaper source o f 
supply. In particular, purchases from Israel may enable Turkey to circumvent US 
conditions on arms sales, such as those requiring a balance o f  forces between Greece 
and Turkey, or restricting the transfer o f specific arms when they might be used in 
the abuse o f  human rights (because o f the strings attached, Ankara cannot use some
Şükrü Elekdağ told the author that as Turkish Ambassador to Washington he used to contact 
personally all the Jewish members o f Congress right before the decision on the “Armenian resolution” 
was expected. Interview with the Ambassador, 15 May 1998, Ankara.
Ron Ben-Yishav, “Mordechai to Press for Tighter US Cooperation with Turkey”, Yediot Aharonot, 
3 April 1997, Uanslation carried by FBIS online, April 4 1997.
Zvi Bar’el, “A Turkish Love Story”, Ha 'aretz, 14 December 1997.
Quoted by Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie”, p.21.
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kind o f weapons in the southeast). Israel’s state o f the art military technology and its 
well-documented specialty to modernize aging and obsolete equipment made it an 
invaluable partner for Ankara.'**^ “We heard and learnt about, and saw high-tech, 
state o f the art technological ventures, pertaining to almost all areas on the military, 
and all o f them developed and produced by Israel” said General Bir after visiting 
some Israeli defense industries. Moreover, Israel has demonstrated -  in contrast 
with the US -  the willingness to share with Ankara its technology and know-how in 
joint defense projects; this access to Israeli technology is fundamental for Turkey’s 
policy o f strengthening its own defense industry. Israel has already agreed to set up 
production lines for the stand-off air to ground missile Popeye II in Turkey,*** while 
the upgrading o f the Turkish 54 F-4s is carried out by both the Israeli Aircraft 
Industries (lAI) and the maintenance center (Hava ikmal Bakım Merkezi-HIBM) o f 
the Turkish Air Force in Eskişehir.'*  ^ According to General Ergüvenç, Turkey’s 
need to become more self-sufficient in meeting its military requirements is “perhaps 
the most rational explanation for Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Israel” .
During a visit to Israel in February 1997, Turkey’s then Chief o f General 
Staff, General Ismail Karadayi, stated: “The prior item o f this cooperation should be 
the struggle against international terrorism”. In so doing. General Karadayi clearly 
delineated an additional Turkey’s goal in improving its ties with Israel. However, 
despite the fact that the two countries share a similar approach to terrorism, Ankara’s
The Commander o f the Turkish Air Force stated that Turkey had no option but to make use of 
Israel to upgrade the aircraft [the F-4s|” as reported by Dror Marom, “Phantom Jet Deal Won’t Be 
Cancelled Despite Turkish PM’s Opposition”, Israel Business Arena, 2 December 19%.
Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry-Jerusalem, “Mordechai Meeting with Turkish 
Deputy Chief o f Staff”, 5 May 1997 in gopher:Wisrael-info-go.. ./dip/docs/970505t.fan
A. O ’Sullivan, “Israel, Turkey to Make Popeye Missiles”, Jerusalem Post, 5 December 1997, p.4.
A. O ’Sullivan, “Turkey, Israel Sign Delayed Defence Industry Pact”, Jerusalem Post, 29 August 
1996, p.l2.
Sadi Ergiiven?, “Turkey’s Security Perceptions”, p.41.
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pleas for cooperation against the PKK and Syria had been always played down by 
Israel. The Turkish thesis put forward by Foreign Minister Çetin during his visit to 
Israel (13-14 November 1993) that several terrorist factions protected and sponsored 
by Syria equally threatened Ankara and Jerusalem did not entirely convince the 
Israelis. The Israeli authorities pointed out that the PKK -  engaged since 1984 in a 
bloody armed-struggle against the Turkish government -  had never targeted Israel. 
Çetin’s call for a joint Turkish-Israeli effort against the PKK failed; the Israelis 
quickly rejected the Turkish request by replying that “Israel did not wish to have new 
enemies”. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Israel did not exclude the possibility o f cooperation 
against international terrorism but refused to join in a campaign specifically designed 
against the PKK.’^^  This materialized in an arrangement concluded in November 
1994 that relegated antiterrorist efforts to a bilateral police agreement. Israel’s 
rejection to take sides against Kurdish terrorism results principally from fears o f 
opening a new terrorist front vis-à-vis the PKK and the existence o f  persistent pro- 
Kurdish sentiments in Israel, as demonstrated by the extensive support for the 
Kurdish struggle in Northern Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s.
Having realized the impossibility to obtain Israeli military help in fighting the 
PKK, Ankara decided to seek Israeli assistance against Syria, the main sponsor o f the 
PKK. Again, Israel was clearly ambivalent about close cooperation with Turkey if it 
appeared too obviously aimed at Syria. Both the Rabin and Peres governments were
Quoted by Joseph Leitmann and Cagri Erdem, “Turkey: Benefiting from David’s Army”, SFSUIR 
Journal (Winter 1997) (electronic journal at http://psirus.sfsu.edu/intrel/IRJoumal/).
Çetin, in an interview given to the Jerusalem Post, openly accused Syria of protecting and 
guaranteeing a safe-heaven to the terrorists o f the PKK, Jihad and Hizbullah and added that “Turkey 
and Israel should fight together against Damascus’ sponsored terrorism”. The Israeli position also 
appears in the same article: Jerusalem Post, 16 November 1993, p.l.
According to the Turkish Probe, the Israeli authorities decided to examine carefully the Turkish 
proposal for a cooperation agreement against drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and organized 
crime. See Turkish probe, 18 November 1993, p.3.
' Regarding the pro-Kurdish sentiment existing in some circles in Israel, see Makovsky, 1996, p. 166.
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too involved in pursuing a peace agreement with Syria to take into account Turkey’s 
susceptibilities and interests vis-à-vis D a m a s c u s . T h e  government led by Rabin, 
and afterwards by Peres, had mixed feelings about the relationship with Turkey 
because, in Efraim Inbar’s opinion, “they believed, and there are people still in Israel 
who do so, that good relations with Turkey might interfere with our plans to make 
peace with Syria” . Nevertheless, all the Turkish officials who visited Israel before 
the conclusion o f the military cooperation agreement repeatedly stressed the threat 
posed by Damascus’ support for “terrorism”.C o n tem p o ran eo u sly , Turkey adopted 
an increasingly hard stance toward Damascus: in January 1996, Ankara demanded 
that Syria extradite Abdullah Ocalan. While the request did not constitute anything 
new, this marked the first time that Ankara publicly announced its demand.*^* In 
short, Ankara, having secured a military agreement with Israel -  at that time still 
undisclosed -  decided to put maximum pressure on Damascus by openly announcing 
its demand for the extradition o f  the PKK leader. As no positive reply came from 
Asad, the subsequent step was to leak to the press the news regarding the Turkish- 
Israeli military agreement This was interpreted by the Turkish press as a clear 
sign o f Ankara’s unwillingness to support a peace process between Israel and Syria, 
which in early 1996 had reached a critical s t a g e , t h a t  might have affected Turkey’s
In summer 1994, Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Itamar Rabinovich, said that Jerusalem did not 
want to give Asad the impression that Israel and Tuikey are “ganging up on him”. As reported by 
Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish ‘Periphery Strategy’*?”, p.l55.
Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership”.
Yediot Aharonot, 28 January 1994 as translated by FBIS, 29 January 1994.See SWB MED/2508 
MED/7, 13 January 1996 and Thomas O ’Dwyer, “Tmldsh Deputy Minister: Europe To Blame For 
Islamic Party’s Success”, Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1996, p.4.
' Robert Olson, “Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water”, Middle East Policy 
5:2 (1997), p. 177.
“In the beginning, we would argue with the Turks over who was responsible for the leaks”, an 
Israeli officials stated. As reported by Steve Rodan, “Ties with Turkey -  The Most Important Story of 
the Decade”, Jerusalem Post, 13 June 1996.
Uri Savir, one of the chief Israeli negotiators involved in the peace talks with Syria, said that “In 
February 1996 we had passed the point o f no return, the moment when you feel you are moving
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interests. Turkey’s apprehensiveness in early 1996 about the Israeli-Syrian peace 
negotiations was reflected by Onur Oymen, the Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister, 
who, during his talks in Israel, in very undiplomatic terms called Israeli policy 
towards Syria “appeasement” .^ ”^
While it remains to be determined whether -  or to what extent -  Turkey’s 
stratagem o f announcing its military deal with Israel was responsible for the failure 
o f the Israeli-Syrian negotiations, it is clear that Ankara was fully aware that its offer 
to conclude a military cooperation agreement was too enticing for the Israelis to 
refuse. The alliance with Turkey immeasurably strengthens Israel’s security while 
reducing its perceived need to negotiate a settlement with Syria. In the words o f Uri 
Or, a reserve General and former joint-Minister o f Defense in the Peres government, 
“it is a positive factor for Israel that Syria has an enemy on its northern frontiers. 
Syria will never attack Turkey, but it cannot exclude the reverse” . S u c h  a scenario 
that came close to reality during the Turkish-Syrian crisis o f September-October 
1998.
4.3 Israel’s Goals:
As Ed Blanche argues, “Israel is now conducting what is probably the 
broadest and most far-reaching review o f its strategic doctrine in history”. ”^'* 
Following recent developments in the region, in particular the proliferation o f 
weapons o f mass destruction (WMD) and long-range ballistic missiles, and the shock
towards an agreement”, as reported by Alain Greish, “Turkish-Israeli Relations and their Impact on 
the Middle East”, p. 198.
See Robert Olson, “Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water”, pp. 177-178. 
The episode is described by Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership”.
As reported by Alain Greish, “Turkish-Israeli Relations and their Impact on the Middle East”, 
p.192.
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o f the Gulf War when the country was paralyzed for weeks because o f  the Scud 
threat, the Israelis have come to the conclusion that impeding regional threats 
cannot be dealt with unilaterally, especially when they are concentrated in the more 
distant countries. This has encouraged Israeli policy-makers to seek tacit or overt 
alliances with nearby states and cooperation with foreign partners. In 1993, the 
former Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, suggested that the traditional 
approach to security based primarily on self-reliance was no longer relevant and it 
had to be substituted with a regional approach.
The combination o f Turkey's military power, its strategic location bordering 
Iran, Iraq and Syria and its close ideological affinity with Israel, make Turkey an 
invaluable ally in the region. Despite the fact that both countries have made clear 
countless times that their cooperation does not target any third country in the region, 
Israeli officials have not hesitated to stress, whenever possible, the great value that 
they place on Israel’s relationship with Turkey. In a press briefing during his visit to 
Ankara, on 8 December 1997, the Israeli Minister o f Defense, Yitzhak Mordechai, 
summed up the overall Israeli aim o f  the relation with Turkey, stating that “when we 
lock hands we will form a powerfiil fist. This relation will help us defend ourselves 
against any threat and help establish peace in the region”. He also added that “I 
certainly described the relationship between us and the Turks as the development o f a
Ed Blanche, “Israel addresses the threats of the new millennium”, Jane's Intelligence Review 11:2 
(February 1999), p. 24. See also Eliot A. Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich, 
“Israel’s Revolution in Security Affairs”, Survival 40: 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 48-67.
As Naveh points out, “By employing surface-to-surface ballistic missiles against civilian targets 
located in depth, a hostile state which does not share a mutual border with Israel managed to inflict 
strategic terror upon the Jewish state” in Shimon Naveh. “The Cult o f the Offensive Preemption and 
Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought” in Efraim Karsh, ed.. Between War and Peace. 
Dilemmas o f Israeli Security (London: Frank C ass, 1996), p. 170.
Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 61-64.
Ha-aretz, “Turkey pledges to deepen ties”, 9 December 1997.
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strategic relationship” .^ ®** Mordechai’s remarks were echoed by Israeli Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated that the new Israeli-Turkish military ties 
could serve as the “axis” o f a future regional structure.^®®
Facing the threat o f long-range missiles that has made the home front more 
vulnerable, Israel is now focusing more and more on “over-the-horizon capabilities” 
that would allow its Air Force to hit a distant enemy, possibly with a preemptive 
strike. Turkey -  even without directly participating in a war -  could play an 
important role: it could allow damaged Israeli aircraft to land at Turkish bases, 
permit Israeli combat Search and Rescue (SAR) crews to snatch downed pilots while 
operating from its soil and allow air-refueling operations in its skies, which would 
greatly increase Israeli striking range and “allow the Israeli air force to be more 
aggressive and take greater risks’’.^ *® In this regard, it is relevant to note that such a 
war-like scenario has been depicted, during the February 1998 crisis with Iraq, by the 
former Turkish Ambassador to Washington, who openly stated that Turkey would
consider allowing Israel to use Turkish airspace to retaliate for a possible Iraqi
211missile attack on Israel.
For Iran and Iraq, Turkish-Israeli military cooperation has brought Israel to 
their borders. Israel now has a “window” on the territories o f both the “rogue states” 
through which it can undertake monitoring and electronic listening operations and 
stage air strikes on Iran's non-conventional weapons infrastructure. What is certain is 
the fact that Syria, Iran and Iraq now have to take into account the new strategic
Arieh O ’Sullivan “News”, Jerusalem Post, 10 December 1997, p. 7.
Alparslan Esmer, “PM Yilmaz’s trip to Israel clouds other visits”, Turkish Probe, 13 September 
1998, p. 12 and for an Israeli source see Ha-aretz, “Bashing, promising and whitewashing” 3 
September 1998.
Michael Eisenstadt, “Turldsh-Israeli Military Cooperation. An Assessment”, PolicyWatch, no. 262, 
24 July 1997.
73
reality brought about by the Turkish-Israeli axis when developing their military- 
strategic plans: an “element o f uncertainty”^'^ has been introduced in the military 
calculations o f Teheran, Baghdad and Damascus. As Zvi Bar’el put it, “The strategic 
cooperation [with Turkey] is o f supreme importance to Israel” .^'^
As in the case o f Turkey, Israel sees its alignment with Ankara as an 
important asset to strengthen its ties with the US and, at the same time, as an 
“alternative” in the case that its ties relations with Washington turn to the worse. 
Both Turkey and Israel fear a reduced involvement o f the US in the Middle Eastern 
region. Effaim Inbar openly argued that “Both Israel and Turkey fear abandonment 
by the West . . Israel seems to be in a better position that Turkey in Washington, but 
both are interested in strengthening their ties with the US, which for various reasons 
is not sensitive enough to their security needs’’.^'“* Indeed, Turkish links with the US 
through its participation in NATO also tie well with Israel’s close relationship with 
the US. In the new US-dominated international order, the differing points o f view 
between Jerusalem and Washington, most notably on the implementation o f the 
peace agreement with the PLO, are clearly resurfacing. This is also linked to the fact 
that, in the post-Cold War era, US-Israel relations are much harder to isolate from 
W ashington’s other relationships in the region. In the long run, this could undermine 
the mutual trust between Israel and the US, which had been already partially affected 
by the espionage scandal between the two countries that broke out in 1996.^'^ 
Against this background, it is not surprising that several Israeli scholars have
Ugur Akinci, “Kandemir: Turkey may allow Israel to retaliate against Iraq”, Turkish Daily News, 
21 February 1998, pp. 1-2.
Eisenstadt, “Turkish-lsraeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment
Zvi Bar’el, “A Double-Edged Alliance”, H a’aretz, 19 October 1997. Previously, the Jerusalem 
Post titled “Ties with Turkey -  The Most Important Story o f the Decade”, 13 June 1996.
Efraim Inbar, “A New Balance o f  Power”, Jerusalem Post, 15 December 1997, p.8.
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repeatedly advocated the development o f contingency plans to augment or to 
substitute — wholly or partially — the current main source o f strategic resources: the
Turkey, by strengthening Israel’s security and by reducing Israel’s perceived 
need to conclude a settlement with Syria, perfectly suits Jerusalem’s need for 
strategic diversification.
A further rationale for Israel to join in a strategic alliance with Turkey is 
provided by its giant defense industries’ dire need to find new markets. The Israeli 
military industries, an essential element in Israel’s technological superiority, have 
been facing in the last years serious economic trouble as a result o f the shrinking 
world arms market after the end o f the Cold War and the decrease in Israeli defense 
expenditures.^*^ Consequently, this has in turn reemphasized the concentration on 
finding strategic partners who will purchase weapons and to whom Israel feels able 
to sell to. As Inbar plainly acknowledged, “The Turkish Army has at its disposal $30 
billion dollars for the next ten years to spend on modernization, and, o f course, it will 
be nice if we get a nice piece o f it” . '^*
In conclusion, on a military-strategic level Turkey does suit the Israeli 
objectives o f putting pressure on Syria, offering new options for potential air strikes 
on Iraq and Iran, and carrying out intelligence activity on Turkey’s southern 
neighbors. On the economic and political level, Turkey has already demonstrated 
itself to be a formidable purchaser o f Israeli weapons and it may become a bridge to
The US General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, reported in 1996 that Israel 
“conducts the most aggressive espionage operation against the US o f  any US ally” in Ed Blanche, 
“Israel addresses the threats o f the new millennium”, p.27.
Just to mention a recent example; Martin Sherman, “Diversifying Strategic Reliance: Broadening 
the Base o f Israel’s Sources o f Strategic Support”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies -  Quarterly 
Strategic Assessment, vol. 1, n.4, 1998 (electronic journal at http;//www.tau.ac.il:81/jcss/vln4p4.html).
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Central Asia for the Israeli entrepreneurs looking for business opportunities in the 
newly independent republics o f the former Soviet Union.
4.4 The Military Cooperation:
On February 23, 1996, Israel and Turkey signed a military cooperation 
agreement providing for the exchange o f military information, experience, and 
personnel. It called, inter cilici, for joint training exercises, exchange o f military 
observers at each other’s exercises, and reciprocal port access for naval vessels. Each 
country’s planes exercise in the other’s airspace for one week four times a year; since 
April 1996 these exercises have occurred regularly. Such visits are mutually 
beneficial They enable the Israeli pilots to gain experience flying long-range 
missions (a skill that would be necessary for missions over Iran) and over 
mountainous areas, where visually identifying an enemy aircraft is more difficult 
than during over-sea flights. In exchange, Turkish pilots have the opportunity to 
benefit from Israel’s systems o f training in advanced technology warfare, in 
particular, they have access to the air combat maneuvering instrumentation range in 
the N e g e v . S i n c e  such exercises also enable both air forces to become familiar 
with procedure and tactics used by their counterparts, this could greatly facilitate 
cooperation in wartime.
The original memorandum that constituted the basis for the military cooperation agreement reached 
in February 1996 was signed in the previous September. Regarding the exact place and date o f the 
latter signatine a substantial confusion still prevails. The data indicated are the ones given by General 
Bir to the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak and Cumhuriyet, see SWB ME/2634 MED/8, 10 June 1996.
According to the Jerusalem Post, in 1997, “the Israeli fighter jets have carried out 120 sorties in 
Turkey, many o f them practice for long-range missions, since Israeli air space is so limited” in Arieh 
O'Sullivan “lAF jets fly long-range training sorties in Turkey”, Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1997, p. 
3.
According to some press reports, in August 1998, the Israeli Air Force had trained Turkish pilots 
for an air-strike against Paphos (the new Greek-Cypriot airbase where the Russian S-300 missiles 
were supposed to be deployed), using a mockup of the airbase derived from reconnaissance photos 
taken by Israeli aircraft. See Global Intelligence Update, “Turkey attempts to forge bloc impeding 
Cyprus Crisis”, 10 September 1998.
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In January 1998, the navies o f Israel, Turkey and the US held joint naval 
search and rescue (SAR) exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean that have involved 
five vessels and helicopters. Despite their official “humanitarian purpose”, the SAR 
maneuvers were, according to the experts, similar to naval operations aimed at 
localizing and intercepting an enemy vessel.
The military agreements are also believed to have strengthened the long­
standing intelligence ties between Turkey and Israel. In April 1996, addressing the 
Washington Research Institute, General Çevik Bir, revealed that Israel had requested 
Furkey’s assistance in collecting information. Israel’s first priority target is Syria, 
while Iran is the second. General Bir said. The positive reply by Ankara was taken 
for granted.^^^
In exchange, Turkey will benefit from Israel’s experience in the “security 
zone” in Lebanon in monitoring its borders with Iraq and preventing cross-border 
infiltration by the PKK terrorists. During his visit to Israel in May 1997, the Turkish 
Defense Minister visited the Golan Heights in order to check if the methods 
employed by the Israelis to prevent cross border infiltration were applicable along 
the Turkish-Iraqi border. It seems also likely that -  despite the denials by the Turkish 
and Israeli authorities -  Israeli military advisers have been involved in the planning 
o f the Turkish military offensive in Northern Iraq and in the laying o f mines and trip 
wire sensors along the Turkish-Iraqi border.
Jane's Defence Weekly, “Naval exercise will link Israel, Turkey and USA”, 17 December 1997, p.
6 .
SWB ME/2581 MED/9, 9 April 1996.
Robert Olson, “Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water”, p. 178-9. The 
Secretary o f the Socialist Party o f Kurdistan, Muhammad Hajji Mahmud has stated that, in June 1997, 
17 Israeli military advisers took part in a militaiy action carried out by the Turkish forces along the 
border. As reported by both IRNA and MED-TV, see SWB ME/2922 M E D /8,19 June 1997.
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Regarding the PKK issue, Israel has clearly abandoned its reluctance to be 
involved in the conflict against the PKK; the changed attitude can be attributed to 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s election as Israeli Prime Minister (May 1996) and to the 
subsequent freezing o f the peace-process. Netanyahu did not hesitate to condemn 
Syria’s support for the PKK and supported vigorously the idea o f a joint struggle 
against terrorism aimed at isolating countries sponsoring terrorist groups. The former 
Israeli premier, in a television interview to a Turkish network, openly rejected the 
idea o f a Kurdish state and condemned the PKK; “Turkey has suffered the attacks 
from terrorist attacks from the PKK and we see no difference between the terrorism 
o f the PKK and that which Israel suffers” .^ ^^  But the Israeli officials immediately 
stressed that “We are not talking about hurting the Kurds. We are talking more about 
dealing with the host o f groups that Syria supports” .^ ^^
Finally, a joint forum for strategic research and assessment, which meets 
every six months, has been institutionalized. During these meetings high level 
officials discuss the dire strategic issues at stake. As Efraim Inbar argues, “This is 
probably the heart o f the relationship” .
The military agreement on defense industry, signed on August 26, 1996, has 
established the legal framework for the transfer o f military technology and know­
how. This allows the Turkish Army -  with the Pentagon’s blessing -  to obtain 
weapons and technology that Turkey would not be able to get in Europe and/or in the 
US, because o f its human rights record and its dispute with Greece.
The reliability, the technology and the capacity to cover almost all needs of 
defense has made the Israeli military industry an unique partner for the Turkish
Printed in Ha 'aretz, 27 May 1997.
““  As reported by Steve Rodan, “A Growing Alliance”, Jerusalem Post, 2 May 1997, p.9. 
Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish-lsraeli Strategic Partnership”.
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Armed Forces, which are currently engaged in a giant program of investment: a plan 
for rearmament and modernization o f about $31 billion over five years, which will 
reach $150 billion in 25 y e a r s . T h e  transfer o f Israeli technology is also functional 
to the goal o f developing the Turkish defense industry that today can cover only 21% 
o f the Armed Forces’ requirements.
The agreement on military industry cooperation has led to an extraordinary 
range o f actual and possible arms sales, overwhelmingly fi'om Israel to Turkey, 
characterized by a significant amount o f work given to Turkish f i r m s . T h e  giant 
investment program in defense undertaken by Turkey constitutes a “gold mine” for 
Israeli defense industries. As the then Israeli Minister o f Defense Yitzhak Mordechai 
said “we have opened the way to Israeli firms in order to increase the volume o f sales 
and activities in Turkey. . .we are just at the beginning”. T h e  defense contracts 
concluded with Turkey constitute an invaluable opportunity for the Israeli defense 
industries striving to maintain their technological advantage over the neighboring 
countries and, contemporaneously, suffering because o f Israel’s decreasing defense 
budget and the crisis o f the world arms market.
The potentialities inherent in Turkey’s defense needs were clearly remarked 
by General (Rtd.) Sitki Orun, a technical adviser o f the Turkish Armed Force
Turkish Daily News, 1 February 1998.
Regarding Ankara's plan to expand its defense industry see “A Turkish Defence Industry” in 
NATO's 16 Nations & Partners for Peace-Special Issue; ‘Defence and Economics in Turkey; Pillar o f  
stability' (Bonn: Monch, 1998).
The largest contract that Israel has won so far is a $630 milhon agreement to upgrade 54 Turkish 
F-4 fighters, then an Israeli-Singaporean consortium won a $75 milhon contract to do the same to 48 
F-5. Turkey agreed to buy 100 Popeye I air-to-ground missiles, larger fuel tanks for its F-16s and to 
co-produce 200 Popeye II for the same aircraft. Israel is bidding to have its Merkava chosen as 
Turkey's new battle tank and has proposed to upgrade Turicey's aging M-60 tanks, to sell unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and early warning aircraft (AEWC). Israel is also participating in a joint 
venture with the Russian Kamov helicopter company and in a similar arrangement with the competing 
Italian firm Agusta, both bidding to sell combat helicopters to Turkey. In 1998, Israel and Turkey 
reportedly agreed to cooperate on the production o f a new medium range anti-ballistic missile called 
“Delilah” similar to the “Arrow” missile that Israel has developed with considerable US funding.
Reuters, “Israel eyes ‘gold mine’ in Turkish arms deals”, 9 December 1997.
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Foundation in an interview given to the Jerusalem Post on January 1997. After 
pointing out that Turkey’s defense budget keeps growing, General Orun declared that 
the suspensions in arms export adopted ever more frequently by the US and the 
European countries give a great advantage to Israeli firms, The same opinion has 
been re-stated by Efraim Inbar, who said that “We [Israelis] have learned long ago, 
and the Turks more recently, that the United States as well as other Western powers 
are not always reliable weapons suppliers for political and various reasons, and 
therefore, you have to get some kind o f a new genesis capacity”. He concluded by 
mentioning that “ It is a good business and we are willing also to transfer technology 
which is very important to the Turks, because they buy weapons under the conditions
233that some o f the technology is being transferred to them”.
4.5 Cooperation in Civilian Domains:
Turkish-Israeli relations have developed in an unprecedented way, the 
extraordinary flurry o f high-level visits between the two countries over the past six 
years has resulted in various agreements embracing virtually all sectors. These 
include interaction in the domains o f culture, education and science; the environment 
and nature protection; mail and telecommunications; efforts to stop the smuggling o f 
drugs and narcotic substances; health and agriculture: regulation o f free trade o f 
custom duties, encouragement and protection o f financial investments; avoidance o f 
dual taxation; and technical and economic cooperation.^^"* In short, alongside close 
military ties, there is extensive non-military cooperation between Turkey and Israel, 
with great potential for further expansion.
Steve Rodan, “Turkey wants more arms deal with Israel”, Jerusalem Post, 27 January 1997, p.8. 
Efraim Inbar,, “The Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership”
2.1') As indicated by Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie”, p,26.
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On July 18, 1997, a week after the vote o f confidence, the coalition 
government headed by Mesut Yılmaz approved the decree that put into force the 
free-trade area agreement between Israel and Turkey. The agreement was 
originally signed during Turkish President Süleyman Demirel’s visit to Israel (March 
1996), and ratified by the Turkish Parliament in April 1997, but the necessary final 
approval by the government had been postponed several times by the Erbakan-led 
cabinet.
The decree signed by Prime Minister Yılmaz opened new possibilities for 
economic relations between the two countries, not only in the commercial sphere but 
also in investments, industrial and agricultural cooperation. The aim o f both sides is 
to reach in 2000 a bilateral trade volume o f $2 billion, an ambitious target but not 
unrealizable: in 1998, bilateral trade has registered a volume o f more than $700 
million, whereas only eleven years earlier it was about $18 million.
Israel has also opened the US market to Turkish products: Turks sell textiles 
and other commodities duty-free to Israel, which adds its labor to the product and re­
exports then to the US duty-free^^^ This boosts the Turkish economy, which hires 
Israeli companies to develop irrigation and agricultural projects in the GAP (the 
Southeastern Anatolian Project) region. Israeli firms have shown a considerable 
interest in the GAP, several textile firms attracted by the lower labor costs moved 
from Israel to Turkey’s Southeast. Many opportunities to use Israeli technology for 
the transportation and distribution o f water are also foreseen. The cooperation 
includes also training activities: Turkish officials involved in the GAP project are
The Free Trade Agreement provides for the mutual elimination o f custom duties for more than 90 
per cent o f goods. For the remaining 10 per cent, custom duties are to be abolished by the year 2000. 
^  Turkish Probe, “Turkey, Israel move closer to custom pact”, 15 March 1996, p.24.
See Saadet Oruç, “Turkish trade via Israel to the US expected to boost export volume” Turkish 
Daily News, 5 January 1999.
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regularly attending training courses at the International Training Center for 
Agricultural Development and Cooperation (CINADCO), Israel’s large agriculture 
research and training center.
Tourists are a prominent part o f non-military relations, some 300,000 to 
400,000 Israeli tourists visit Turkey each year, spending more than $400 million^^®, 
an impressive growth in comparison with the just 7,000 Israelis that visited Turkey in 
1986.
Moreover, Turkey has been showing since 1990 -  despite sharp Arab 
criticism -  a marked interest in selling water to Israel. In 1996, President Demirel 
announced that Turkey would have been able, starting from late 1998, to sell 150 
million cubic meters o f water per year to I s r a e l . T h e  same offer was reiterated by 
Prime Minister Yılmaz during his visit to Jerusalem in September 1998. '^^‘^ Despite 
the Israeli interest in buying water from Turkey -  indicated by both President 
Weizman and Prime Minister Netanyahu^^' — the conclusion o f the deal has been so 
far hindered because the Israelis want a 30-year long agreement, whereas Ankara is 
willing to sign only a medium-term contract.
The importance o f the economic relations cannot be underestimated, 
especially if  we take into account the existing opportunities for further developments 
both in the two countries and in neighboring regions of Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus, where a Turkish “entrance card” may facilitate Israel’s desire to 
expand exchanges. The Israeli Trade Minister Micha Harish, during Turkish
Figures indicated by Ekrem Güvendiren, President of the joint Turkish-Israeli Council for 
Economic Cooperation and reported by the Turkish Daily News, 1 February 1998.
SWB MEW/0427 WME/6, 19 March 1996
Nicole Pope, “Yilmaz welcomed in Israel”, MEl, 18 September 1998, p.9.
Respectively, SWB EE/1907 B/7, 28 January 1994 and SWB ME/2827 MED/5, 27 January 1997. 
Laurent Mallet, “N ell’ex Asia Soviética sionismo fa rima con capitalismo”, LiMes 4 (1995), p.255. 
However, it should be pointed out that the Israeli-Turldsh relationship on the politics o f Central Asia
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Foreign Minister Hickmet (^etin’s visit in November 1993, indicated that Ankara was 
a cardinal partner in the Israeli plan to penetrate economically the countries o f 
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The Israeli minister openly stated that “Turkey 
can play an essential role as an intermediary between Israel and the Muslim 
Republics o f the former Soviet Union”. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres 
attracted the interest o f the Turks when he proposed -  during his visit in April 1994 -  
the possibility o f a collective partnership between the US, Israel and Turkey aimed at 
launching economic projects in the Central Asian Republics o f the former Soviet 
Union. Following Washington’s approach, Peres declared that “any person o f 
common sense should prey for the success o f the secular and democratic Turkish 
model over the Iranian in the competition to achieve influence over the Central Asian 
Muslim Republics” '^*'*. A few months later, an agreement was signed between the 
Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA), Israel and the US to launch a 
common agricultural program in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.^'*^ More recently, 
Israel has manifested its interest in gaining access to oil and gas from Turkey should 
Turkey’s ambition to become a major pipeline route for energy resources from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia be realized.
The 19 agreements concluded, since 1990, by Turkey and Israel clearly 
manifest the importance attached by both sides to their bilateral relations.
has been so far less suceessiul than expected for both participants. See Neill Lochciy, “Israel and 
Turkey: Deepening Ties and Strategic Implications, 1995-98”, Israeli Affairs 5:1 (1998), p.57.
Jerusalem Post, 15 November 1993, p.2.
SWB EE/1972 B/6-7, 15 April 1994.
Turkish Daily News, 1 November 1994.
See Saadet Oruç, “Turkey wants to become a transit country for Turkmen gas to Israel”, Turkish 
Daily News, 11 March 1998; and by the same author, “Turkey, Israel to enhance strategic tics with 
Caucasus”, Turkish Daily News, 16 March 1998.
The total number of the agreements has been indicated by Oguz Çelikkol, a high-ranking official at 
the Turkish Ministiy o f Foreign Affairs, in his speech “Turkey and the Middle East. Policy and 
Prospects” given at the Washington Institute on 6 April 1998.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS.
The Turkish-Israeli alliances o f 1958 and 1996 constitute an interesting test 
o f alternative explanations o f alliance behavior. The various factors adduced to 
explain alliance formation -  external, domestic and ideational -  all play a role in this 
case study. Nevertheless, the evidence o f the Turlcish-Israeli relations indicate the 
predominance o f external factors. However, an open question remains: is there a 
difference in terms o f the stability o f alliances between those based purely, or 
mainly, on strategic and environmental factors and those which in addition have 
ideological components? This thesis tentatively concludes that an analysis o f the 
Turkish-Israeli relations between 1949 and 1999, generally, and specifically a 
comparison between the short-lived Turkish-Israeli alliance o f 1958 and the recent 
developments o f a new Turkish-Israeli military alignment, indicates that alliances 
based on community o f interests are distinct from alliances based on community o f 
interests and shared ideational values.
After briefly reviewing theories o f alliance formations, this chapter will 
discuss the relevance o f the different theoretical approaches to the specific case o f 
Turkey and Israel.
5.1 Review of explanations of alliances:
The aggregation o f power model o f alliances assumes that allies value each 
other for the military assistance they can provide one another. According to this
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model, the increased credibility o f military intervention advances the allies’ mutual 
interest in the deterrence o f a common external threat.
In contrast, in the internal approach the alliance behavior of Third World 
states or small states is determined by the trade-offs that political leaders make 
among domestic and international goals. In these states, choices between external 
alliances and internal military mobilization are often determined more by domestic 
threats to the stability o f  the regime rather than by solely external threats.
Finally, a third approach argues that due to the importance o f the relation 
between states’ identity and the construction o f the threats, it is the politics o f 
identity rather than the logic o f  anarchy that provides a better understanding o f 
alliance behavior.
5.2 The case of Turkey and Israel:
In both 1958 and 1996, Turkey and Israel have been motivated by mutual 
interests to weave their ties. Both countries, in defiance of their geographical 
location, have always had Western aspirations and, therefore, found themselves 
profoundly at odds with the region in which they are located. Yet, despite the shared 
sense o f commonality, their relationship has been historically characterized by 
discontinuity rather than continuity, a feature that hindered the possibility to develop 
a genuine and consistent cooperation.
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the decisive factors influencing the 
relationship revolve around regional and global developments. In 1958, the 
circumstances surrounding the “peripheral alliance” between Turkey and Israel were 
predominantly external; Soviet and Nasserist subversion in four Middle Eastern 
countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and, albeit to a lesser extent, Jordan); the growing
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profile o f the Soviet Union in the region, and the progressive emergence o f the US as 
the new Western power in the Middle East. In 1996, the main factors underlying the 
new Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement were again linked to security 
concerns spurred by developments in the external environment: the end o f the Cold 
War and the post-Gulf War developments in the Middle East (i.e. peace process, and 
the internationalization o f the Kurdish question) that affected Turkey and Israel’s 
standing vis-à-vis their Western allies, the proliferation o f weapons o f mass 
destruction in the region; and the increasing instability o f  the Middle East, the 
Balkans and the Caucasus.
The key role played by external factors in favoring the formation o f a 
Turkish-Israeli alliance in 1958 and 1996 indicates that the classical approach to 
alliance formation is better borne out than the domestic-centered one. In particular, 
the hypothesis on alliance formation indicated by W alt’s balance o f threat theory 
provide the best explanation for the Turkish-Israeli alliance o f 1958 and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, o f 1996.
In 1958, Turkey and Israel joined in an alliance to balance the threat posed by 
the Soviets and Nasser. Through the combination o f Israel’s military know how and 
Turkey’s huge army,^ "*** the two states sought to enhance their military capabilities to 
deter the common threat posed by Moscow and Cairo. A sense of threat which was 
aggravated by the four factors that Walt identifies as affecting the level o f threat that 
states may pose: aggregate power (i.e., population, industrial and military capability, 
and technological prowess); geographic proximity; offensive power, and aggressive
2-18 As Nachmani argues, “In the August 1958 agreement, the Turks appeared to have adopted the 
notion o f ‘complementary nations’... Apparently it was to be effected in a number o f ways: export of 
Israeli military equipment to Turkey’s armed forces.. in return, Israel woidd enjoy the support of the 
Turkish giant and o f its army’’. Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in 
the East Mediterranean, p.75.
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intentions. The first factor is self-evident: Moscow was one of two world 
superpowers, whose military potential was not only constituted by its massive 
population and industrial capability but also by its military strength, as indicated in 
1957 by the successful launching into orbit o f the Sputnik. On the other hand, with 
30 per cent o f the Arab population o f the Arab world, Egypt was easily the most 
powerful state in the Middle East.^'’^  Moreover, its already considerable military 
potential was reinforced in the second half o f the 1950s by M oscow’s shipment o f 
weapons^^^ and by the union with Syria. It was thanks to its geographical proximity 
to Turkey that Moscow could undertake a war o f nerves against Ankara 
characterized by the concentration o f troops close to the border with Turkey and 
radio and press verbal attacks. On the other hand, Egypt has a common border with 
Israel and, at that time, had also a common border with Turkey thanks to its union 
with Syria. The large mobile military capabilities o f the Red Army, as indicated by 
the contemporaneous concentration o f 24 divisions close to the border with Turkey 
and by the sending o f a naval unit to Syria during the 1957 crisis, allowed Moscow to 
threaten the territorial integrity o f  any state in the region at acceptable cost. Finally, 
Moscow and Cairo’s aggressive intentions vis-à-vis Ankara and Jerusalem were also 
evident: during the Syrian crisis o f September 1957, “Turkey was threatened with 
Soviet retaliation in unmistakable terms should she undertake any o f her alleged 
sinister activities” .P r e v io u s ly ,  in 1954, Nasser had already declared that “Turkey, 
because o f its Israeli policy, is disliked in the Arab world”. O n  the Syrian front, 
Damascus staged mass demonstrations in Syria’s major cities to claim Hatay, and to
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, p.53.
Egypt received $150 million worth o f Soviet anns in 1957-58, including 700 MIG-17s, additional 
artillery and several naval vessels. Ibid, p.65.
VticncVdiM, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p.l75.
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declare that peace in the Middle East would come only after all Arab lands have been 
returned to their proper owners. As Karpat suggests, “The allusion was obviously to 
Turkey and Israel whose relations had improved” .^ ^^  At the same time, Syria’s ties 
with Moscow were improving; a new arms package was signed in December 1956. 
Following the 1957 crisis, according to Walt, “Egypt and Syria were closer than 
ever, and closer to Moscow” .^ '^* The situation was no better for Israel: 1) The British 
withdrawal from Suez removed an important buffer between Egypt and Israel; 2) 
Nasser was beginning to place greater pressure on Israel in order to enhance his 
image as the Arab leader most devoted to the Palestinian cause; and 3) the formation 
o f the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alignment increased Israel’s fears o f Arab 
encirclement. The news o f the coup, on July 14, 1958, by a group o f Iraqi army 
officers who overthrew the pro-Western monarchy and declared a republic based on 
the model o f the “Egyptian revolution” left Turkey in complete disarray. Encircled 
by a ring o f hostile Arab countries and by the divisions o f the Red Army, Ankara 
hastened to join Israel in the “peripheral alliance”.
All things considered, it is evident that by concluding an alliance Turkey and 
Israel were, in 1958, balancing against an external threat, more specifically they 
sought to counter threats posed by other regional countries by joining their military 
power. In particular, the alliance examined supports W alt’s proposition that 
geographic proximity is an important factor in determining which threats will prompt 
states to seek allies.
Again in 1996, the regional character o f the threat perceived by Turkey and 
Israel has been continuously stressed by officials o f both countries. The fact that Iran
Quoted by Daniel Pipes, “A New Axis- The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente”, National Interest 
50 (1997-98), p.32.
25.1'Kemal Karpat, “Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations”, p. 121.
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and Syria have surface-to-surface missiles capable o f delivering weapons o f mass 
destruction and reports o f Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear capability are serious 
sources o f concerns for both Turkey and Israel. As Ali Karaosmanoglu indicated, 
Turkey’s population centers, dams, power stations, air bases, and military 
headquarters are all within range o f these missiles systems. Israeli Defense 
Minister Mordechai identified Iran, Syria, and Iraq as “above the surface threats” 
because o f their long-range missiles and non-conventional weaponry. The same 
conclusion was put forward by General Bir: “Turkey and Israel face the same threats 
of weapons o f mass destruction”. H e n c e ,  it is not surprising that both countries 
have launched a joint-project for the development o f an anti-ballistic missiles 
(Delilah) capable o f a range o f 150 Km.
The other threat to be countered is, according to both countries, constituted by 
terrorism At present, the main threat to Turkish national defense comes from the 
terrorist activities o f the PKK, which has strongly benefited from the logistical, 
economic and political support received by Turkey’s neighbors. As the Turkish 
Defense Minister put it, “We [Turkey and Israel] regard terrorism as one o f the major 
woes confronting the 21“^ century. Israeli-Turkish cooperation can lead to the 
uprooting o f terrorism and to peace in the region”.
It is therefore evident that the security stimulus which recently led Turkey 
and Israel to join in an alliance is linked to a shared perception o f an external threat, 
which is not as well defined as in 1958 but, nevertheless, just as dangerous. 
However, it is necessary to distinguish between the threat that Turkey and Israel are
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p.71.
As reported by Kemal Kirişçi, “Post-Cold War Turkish Security and the Middle East”, MERIA 2 
(1997) (electronic journal at www.biu.ac.il/bcsa/meria.html).
As quoted by Michael Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan”, p.39.
Çevik Bir, “Turkey’s Role in the New World Order”, p.3.
89
facing in the region where they are located. As already indicated, Ankara’s military
activism in the region may have grown out o f valid strategic concern, but it is not in
response to any serious external military threat to Turkey’s security. The repeated
incursions in northern Iraq and the recent crisis with Syria reflects Turkey’s
emergence as an assertive, self-confident power in the region, emboldened by the
increased strength o f its military posture. For Israel, a nation that was bom in war
and that has lived, ever since, in its shadow, the prospect o f surmounting the
challenges posed by its Arab neighbors is no small accomplishment. Israel, on the
one hand, has to adopt a military profile that does not overtly threaten the Arab
neighbors with whom one day it will one day hopefully live in peace and, on the
other, it has to redefine its capabilities and restmcture its armed forces to meet
challenges from more distant states such as Iran and Iraq. Israeli Major General
Matan Vilnai’s well summarized the dilemma facing Israeli planners:
Wc have to prepare for three very different and often incompatible scenarios. First, 
there is the day-to-day fight against terrorism...Secondly, we must be ready to fight the 
next major conventional war. There is no peace agreement with Syria. Thirdly, we have 
to look beyond the horizon in our time Iran and also Libya have developed into 
potential threat, being in possession o f weapons of mass destruction.. The big difficulty 
with having to plan for these three operational environments is that quite often a 
decision that is very good for the fight against terrorism will be bad for other 
requirements...The trouble is that half-solution is not good, you must have the full 
answer for each environment.
Taking into account the role played by the perception o f external threat in 
urging Turkey and Israel to join in an alliance in 1996, it is possible to argue that the 
evidences presented here are in favor o f W alt’s theory o f balance-of-threat. 
Examining the different components o f threat (power, proximity, offensive
SWB ME/.3099 MED/2, 11 December 1997.
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capability, and perceived intentions) perceived by both states, provides a compelling 
account o f why Turkey and Israel decided to become alliance partners.
This sense o f threat has been aggravated by the increasing strains that have 
characterized Turkey and Israel’s relations with their Western allies since the end o f 
the Cold War. The collapse o f the Soviet Union lessened the strategic worth o f US 
clients, and the US has been more reluctant to meet the changed security priorities o f 
its regional allies, which can no longer count on unconditional economic and military 
assistance and thus fear that they will be abandoned without warning. The end o f the 
Cold War also means the decline o f the globalizing forces o f bipolarity and ideology 
and the growing regionalization o f world politics, therefore, security arrangements in 
the post-Cold War era will increasingly be local in breadth and scope. 
Notwithstanding the importance o f gaining and maintaining the support o f the great 
powers, regional states may come to believe that allying with other regional states 
may provide a number o f benefits. As Walt points out, one benefit o f alliances 
among regional states is that they are more immediately affected by regional 
developments and are thus more likely to take active measures to influence regional 
e v e n t s . A  second related benefit is that the synergy o f cooperation between 
regional states may increase the importance o f each to the great powers.^^^
In the specific case o f Turkey and Israel, both countries felt that Washington 
was increasingly less sensitive to their security needs^^^ and still fear the possibility
As quoted by Eliot A. Cohen etal, “Israel’ Revolution in Security Affairs”, |jp.51-52.
See Patrick Morgan, “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders” in David Lake and 
Patrick Morgan, cds.. Regional Orders -  Building Security in a New World, (University Park, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, p. 161-163
David Pervin, “A Case Study. Turkey and Israel”, paper presented at the annual convention of the 
International Studies Association (ISA), Washington D C., 16-20 February 1999.
““  Efraim Inbar stated that “these countries (Turkey and Israel] feel that they would not get the fairest 
treatment from the US, but it is a very important country as far as their strategic interests”. See “The 
Turkish-lsraeli Strategic Partnership ”.
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of diminished superpower involvement in the region, By acknowledging the first 
crucial fact, Ankara and Jerusalem see the Turkish-Israeli alliance as an alternative to 
safeguard their national sovereignty and protect their vital interests in the region. As 
the former Turkish General Chief o f  Staff, General Ismail Karadayi, put it, “We 
[Turks and Israelis] are surrounded by regimes with various problems, Israel and 
Turkey are two islands o f stability which must be preserved together” . H e n c e ,  
internal mobilization, which involves the domestic mobilization and production o f 
the means o f war, and external alignment, which concerns the construction o f 
strategic alliances, are the choices made by Turkey and Israel as they attempt to 
increase their security and to respond to security threats. At the same time, the 
synergy o f cooperation between Turkey and Israel increases their importance to the 
US. This is most likely to happen because Turkey and Israel’s roles within a US- 
oriented regional security system can be advocated on the basis o f their strategic 
importance, especially in the case o f Turkey, and the ideological similarity o f  both 
countries with the US. To the extent that the two regional powers have considerable 
domestic support within the great power, whether due to ethnic/diaspora groups as in 
the case o f Israel or due strategic relevance for the Executive as in the case o f 
Turkey, their ability to withstand pressure from the great power will be higher than 
otherwise.
What remains to be seen is whether the present Turkish-Israeli alliance will 
be able to overcome future regional and international developments or will dissolve 
because o f them as it happened in 1958. In this regard, the importance played by 
ideational factors in the Turkish-Israeli relationship may positively influence the 
alliance dynamic. Indeed, Turkey and Israel’s sense o f  commonality has been
Quoted by Joseph Leitmann and Cagri Erdem, “Turkey: Benefiting from David’s Army”
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strongly reinforced by the ambiguity shown by the West towards both countries in 
the post-Cold War. During the Cold War, Turkey and Israel were not just allies but 
“stable and reliable” allies because o f their democratic features and Western values. 
The decline o f the East-West confrontation has placed their Western character in 
doubt: Turkey’s repeated rejection by the West and Europe and the crisis that 
characterizes the special relationship between Israel and the are clearly
challenging Turkey and Israel’s standings vis-à-vis the Western community. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that Turkey and Israel collaborate so as "to survive 
as Western societies” . I n  particular, the cooperation with Israel serves well the 
interest o f Turkey’s Kemalist élites in demonstrating Ankara’s continued orientation 
towards the West and its commitment to secularism at a time when the country is 
facing a severe identity crisis that has eroded the main pillars o f Atatiirk’s doctrine 
while allowing greater public space to political Islam, nationalism and neo- 
Ottomanism.^^’ In other words, the partnership with Israel allows Ankara to assume a 
greater profile in the Middle East without having to fear any interference in its own 
internal affairs that may challenge Turkey’s long pursued Westernization project.
In conclusion, even though the Israeli-Turkish relationship is not one in 
which either partner is committed by a mutual defense pact in case o f war, it enables 
Israel to augment significantly its military superiority in the region. The growing 
military relationship with Turkey has introduced a new element into Israeli military 
posture which perfectly fits the new defense doctrine currently being implemented.
See Michel Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East”, pp.437-443.
Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie”, p.29.
According to Hakan Yavuz, Neo-Ottomanism has two faces. “One face looks back to an invented 
Ottoman-Islamic past as a Turk-made epoch. The other looks forward to a vision o f a regionally 
dominated industrialized, but not necessary civic and democratic, Turkey”. For a deeper analysis, see 
Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise o f Neo-Ottomanism”, Critique 
12 (Spring 1998), pp. 19-41.
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an element that “changed the regional balance o f power” according to Moshe 
Arens.^ ^^ *
From a Turkish perspective, doubts and differences with US policy in the 
Middle East have lead Ankara to pursue closer ties with Israel that bolster Turkish 
position in Washington and, at the same time, make sure that if  necessary alternatives 
will be readily available. May be these were the considerations that Ozal had in mind 
in 1986 -  ten years before Turkey concluded the alignment with Israel -  when he 
explained the necessity o f  keeping contacts with Israel, which he regarded “as a 
w indow .. on future events”. For Turkey “to play a role in solving the problems in the 
Middle E ast.. .” he maintained, “that window must remain open”.^ ^^
Quoted by Alain Gresh, “Turkish-Israeli Relations and their Impact on the Middle East”, p. 189. 
Cited in Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s 
to the 1990s”, International Journal o f  Middle Eastern Studies 25 (199.3), p. 103.
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